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In the past 8 years, at least 4 lone wolf terrorists have targeted military bases or 
recruiting centers in the United States and research suggests attack on the US military are 
increasing globally. The problem was that research had not addressed the lived 
experiences of survivors of lone wolf attacks or how they could inform procedures 
regarding a sense of security for military men and women. The purpose of this research 
was to establish a need to address threats to the security of the military from these 
attacks, to provide a rich description of survivors’ experiences of the attack at Fort Hood, 
and to identify suggestions for improving military personnel’s sense of security while on 
base. Using the community based approach to public health, the central research question 
asked how the lived experiences of survivors of the attack at Fort Hood could lead to an 
increased sense of security on base. This phenomenological research provided a detailed 
description of survivors’ experiences and their reflections on improving military 
personnel’s sense of security. The population consisted of the 31 soldiers injured in the 
attack. A purposeful sample was used to recruit 5 participants for researcher-constructed 
interviews. I analyzed data and used NVivo 11 for organization. The study revealed high 
levels of stress, hyperawareness, and significant negative changes in the lives of these 
soldiers. The finding suggest an increased show of force by police throughout the base, a 
designated office to anonymously report suspicious activity, and more training to help 
soldiers cope with the experiences of combat related trauma. The implications for social 
change include an increased sense of security for military personnel, better training for 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Lone wolf terrorists executing attacks against targets inside the United States pose 
a difficult problem for prevention by law enforcement agencies due to the loner nature 
and normative lack of criminal background by the perpetrators (Brooks, 2011; Mantri, 
Spring 2011). There have been multiple successful attacks in recent years against targets 
inside the United States in addition to many attacks foiled by law enforcement. These 
attacks include several which have targeted the United States military either on military 
bases, such as at Fort Hood, Texas (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011); or at recruiting 
centers, such as in Arkansas in 2009 (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011) and Chattanooga, 
Tennessee in 2015 (Keneally, Margolin, Martinez, & Thomas, 2015). One third of all 
terrorist attacks and related activities have targeted the United States military at home and 
abroad (Brooks, 2011, p. 38). The worst of these domestic attacks was the shooting at 
Fort Hood, Texas, where Major Nidal Hasan killed 13 soldiers and wounded 32 others. 
In 1992, the Department of Defense (DoD) issued a military-wide directive that 
set guidelines for all military personnel regarding the carrying of weapons on their person 
while being present on a military installation (Department of Defense, 1992). This 
directive stated that members of the armed forces are not allowed to carry weapons while 
on base unless they could prove that a credible threat to their life existed (Department of 
Defense, 1992). This threat would have to be verified by a superior officer and then 
written permission for the carrying of a weapon would be issued. This directive applied 
to all military personnel with the exception of military police and security forces while 
operating in their official capacity. This gun policy was updated by the DoD on 
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November 18, 2016 in directive 5210.56 (Department of Defense, 2016). The new 
directive allows for military members to apply for on base concealed carry permits for 
general use in 90 day increments given appropriate background clearance. 
The 1992 DoD directive created a situation in which all non-security military 
personnel--which make up less than 7% of enlisted military service members and 2% of 
military officers (United States Department of Labor, 2015)--were left without a means to 
defend themselves during a lone wolf attack. The impetus for the gun policy change was 
to make military personnel safer from harm, especially lone wolf attacks. However, this 
concealed weapons policy is a top-down decision that has been controversial within the 
military community and failed to consider the actual experiences of the victims of lone 
wolf attacks targeting the military (McGarry, 2016). There are no other specific policies 
to counter lone wolf attacks against domestic military targets. Furthermore, there are no 
other specific measures in place to counter the possibility of an active duty member of the 
armed forces committing an act of terror on base. 
Background of the Study 
Terrorism has been a subject of study by scholarly research for decades as 
politically motivated acts of terror has existed for centuries. This research into terrorism 
has normally focused on a narrow set of issues; namely the manner in which terrorists 
act, think, and feel; the types of terrorism; and motivators for terrorism. More recent 
literature has focused on lone wolf and homegrown terrorism. In the last 5 years, 
literature has begun to focus on the response and prevention techniques of terrorist 
activity, specifically for lone wolves. Research has also recently begun to study the post- 
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attack experiences and outcomes for survivors. For the purposes of this dissertation, 
research into lone wolf terrorists and terrorists who are motivated by religious beliefs are 
the focus of the literature. Some of this research is described here:  Cottee and Hayward 
(2011), studied the motivations of terrorism by analyzing the factors which led to 
individuals joining these groups and executing attacks. Moskalenko and McCauley 
(2011) studied the psychology of lone wolf terrorists; including their motivations and 
personality profile by comparing the profiles of five well known lone wolf terrorists. 
McCauley and Moskalenko (2014) used their prior research as a basis for developing a 
profile of lone wolf terrorists and the factors which lead an individual from simply having 
radical opinions to committing radical violence. 
Monahan (2012) used a violent crime individual risk assessment tool in order to 
determine if this tool correlates to predicted participation in terrorist activity. He 
concluded that the current risk assessment tools for violent crime do not correlate to the 
actions of terrorists. 
Phillips (2012) offered an economic model to help law enforcement prevent lone 
wolf terrorist attacks. He posited that using the economic model of risk/reward could help 
prevent terrorism by reducing the reward and increasing the risk for individuals wanting 
to commit terror attacks. He offers several possible options towards this end. 
Mantri (2011) studied the incidence of Muslim homegrown terrorism in the 
United States in order to address the media coverage highlighting this threat. Mantri 
(2011) determined that this threat was overstated. 
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Barnes (2012) also studied Muslim homegrown terrorism from the perspective of 
how effective prevention strategies can be. He determined that these types of terrorists 
are rare and difficult to stop, therefore not worth the manpower and resources assigned to 
their prevention. 
Brooks (2011) studied several means for preventing terrorism that would be 
effective while simultaneously would not condemn members of the Muslim community 
through profiling or other discriminatory techniques. 
Neumann (2013) studied possible effective strategies for countering online 
radicalization efforts by terrorist groups. He determined that the most effective means to 
do prevent online radicalization would be to utilize the efforts of terror groups to gain 
followers through online radicalization against them by gaining access to intelligence in 
order to stop their attacks. 
Pfefferbaum et al. (2014) evaluated the effect of viewing television coverage of 
the 9/11 attacks on survivors of the Oklahoma City bombing. They found that a 
significant amount of the bombing survivors discontinued watching coverage of the 
attacks due to fear and experienced increased worry about their safety and that of their 
family and friends. 
Thoreson, Jensen, and Dyb (2014) studied the effect of media interviews with 
terror attack victims in the direct aftermath in the 2011 Utoya Island attack in Norway. 
The study attempted to measure how these interviews were perceived by the victims. 
There were mixed reactions to these interviews, but the majority viewed the interviews as 




 Since 2009, at least four lone wolf terrorists have targeted military bases or 
recruiting centers in the United States (Keneally, Margolin, Martinez, & Thomas, 2015; 
Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011). In the immediate aftermath of the 2015 attack at a 
recruiting center in Tennessee, the DoD responded by placing armed guards at recruiting 
centers on a temporary basis while still holding firm to their directive banning weapons 
for non-security personnel (Miklaszewski, Kube, & Blankstein, 2015). Terrorism 
research has not addressed how these attacks affect the lived experiences of military 
personnel who survive. Furthermore, researchers have not addressed the means to 
promote a sense of security from these experiences, especially considering that the most 
lethal attack was perpetrated by an Army officer against his fellow soldiers in his office 
at Fort Hood in 2009. The need for studying this issue is amplified by the fact that 
homegrown lone wolf terrorism is so difficult to detect and to prevent (Brooks, 2011; 
Mantri, Spring 2011). The successful use of online radicalization by terror groups in 
recruiting lone wolves appears to be rising (Barnes, 2012; Neumann, 2013). 
 In 1992, a DoD directive restricted all non-security military personnel from 
carrying weapons unless a direct threat to their life was imminent (Department of 
Defense, 1992). In November 2016, the DoD updated this policy to allow military 
personnel to carry personally owned concealed weapons with prior approval (Department 




The problem is that research has not addressed the threat level awareness of lone 
wolves for the military or the lived experiences of survivors of lone wolf attacks. A 
qualitative phenomenological study of these experiences could lead to important insights 
for regaining or increasing a sense of security for these soldiers. These insights might 
inform military policy regarding the improving military personnel’s sense of security 
from external or internal threats while on base. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to establish a need for measures to address threats 
to the security of armed forces personnel from lone wolf attacks, to provide a rich, 
detailed description of survivors’ experiences of the attack at Fort Hood, and to identify 
their reflections on improving military personnel’s sense of security while on base. 
The design of this study was phenomenological, which is the approach I used to 
describe and subsequently understand the lived experiences of military personnel who 
were victims of the 2009 lone wolf attack at Fort Hood, Texas. I used interviews to gather 
a rich, detailed account of their feelings, experiences, and thoughts about the incident in 
addition to how the attack affected their work in the military. In this study, I described 
how these individuals internalized their experiences to gain insight into what actions 
could be taken to improve their sense of security and safety while on base. 
Understanding the lived experiences of our military members can lead to safer 
working conditions for them while decreasing the stress associated with fears for their 
safety. Furthermore, a better understanding of this issue from the perspective of a military 
member in a non-security role can lead to positive social change for these members by 
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initiating policy review which could deter or even prevent future lone wolf terror attacks 
against domestic military bases and/or installations. 
Research Questions 
The central question of this research was: How were the victims of the Fort Hood 
attack affected by this experience in their work and life?  
I used three research questions to address the central research question. 
 RQ1: How aware were the soldiers of the lone wolf threat to military installation 
prior to the attack? 
 RQ2: How did the 2009 attack at Fort Hood affect the work and life of soldiers 
who survived the attack?  
 RQ3: What actions can be taken to regain or increase their personal sense of 
safety while on base? 
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework for this study was based on the idea that policies 
intended to provide safety to military personnel and to prevent and deter lone wolf terror 
attacks are best constructed when the lived experiences of victims of these attacks are 
considered. Furthermore, a sense of security can be enhanced if soldiers are informed and 
aware of threat possibilities and identifying characteristics. By engaging the survivors of 
Fort Hood, detailing their experiences, and obtaining their knowledge and ideas regarding 
improving military personnel’s sense of security while on base, military security policy 
will be better informed. Policy decisions in the military are made with a top-down 
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approach and considerations of these survivors will lead to better policy decisions and 
outcomes regarding safety and security of military personnel. 
 These concepts stem from the theory of a community based approach to public 
health. This theory is based upon seven principles needed to develop policies that will 
“enhance health and safety” (Nilsen, 2006, p. 140). The seven principles identified are: 
(a) communities being both the target and catalyst for policy, (b) community member 
participation, (c) intersectional collaboration, (d) substantial resource requirements, (e) 
long term program view, (f) multifaceted interventions, and (g) population outcome 
(Nilsen, 2006). These principles were transferrable because military policy is created 
with a top-down approach and the participation of the members most effected by the 
policies could reveal valuable information for consideration. The collaboration between 
officers and the enlisted service can create new perspectives for which policies can be 
evaluated. 
The 1992 directive of the DoD limited the ability of members of the military to 
carry firearms on base for personal protection unless specific, unique criteria are met. The 
updated gun policy, while allowing concealed carry for qualified military personnel, still 
more greatly restricts the right to carry than many state laws. The updated gun policy is 
intended to promote safety, security, and promote deterrence from lone wolf terror 
attacks. However, the DoD policy did not consider the lived experiences of the survivors. 
Furthermore, military policy to prevent these attacks has not utilized the experiences of 




Nature of the Study 
This study was a qualitative phenomenological study. The research purpose was 
to provide a rich, detailed examination of how this lone wolf terror attack affected the 
lived experiences of the survivors and to identify what actions can be taken for these 
survivors to regain a sense of personal safety while on base. Phenomenological inquiry 
was well suited to the problem statement and purpose as the goal of phenomenological 
inquiry is to describe the shared lived experiences of subjects within a population who are 
being affected by the same phenomena (Moustakas, 1994; Patton, 2002).  
“Phenomenology studies the common meaning and experiences for a group of 
people who share participation in a phenomenon” (Creswell, 2013, p. 76). In this 
research, the shared participation in a phenomenon was the experience of surviving the 
2009 lone wolf terror attack at Fort Hood, Texas. Phenomenology focuses on what 
participants have in common during their experience and seeks to develop a consensus on 
what is the “universal essence” of the phenomenon’s experience (Creswell, 2013, p. 76).  
When collecting data, qualitative researchers should concurrently analyze the data 
(Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014, p. 70). This practice leads to critical thinking about 
the data and can help the researcher collect richer data by avoiding “blind spots” of the 
phenomena that would otherwise be missed (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014, p. 70).  
In this research, I am specifically attempting to detail and describe how lone wolf terror 
attacks at military installations affect the lived experiences of servicemen and women and 
to gain insight to what actions can be taken regarding increasing a sense safety and 
security while on duty. 
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The participants in this study are 5 Army soldiers who survived the 2009 attack at 
Fort Hood, Texas, and were injured during the attack. I recruited these participants by 
utilizing their social media profiles from the Facebook platform.  
 The primary means of collecting data for this research was interviews conducted 
by telephone. I made an audio recording of the interviews. During data collection, I 
began the coding process to analyze the data. These “chunks” of information are referred 
to as first cycle coding (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014, p. 73). There are many 
differing methods for first cycle coding such as descriptive coding; which assigns labels 
to summarize data in phrases, in vivo coding; which uses actual phrases from the 
participant, and process coding; which uses gerunds to identify observable actions (Miles, 
Huberman, & Saldana, 2014). These methods can be combined when analyzing data. For 
example, I utilized in vivo coding, which takes specific words and phrases from the 
actual participant interviews as codes. Similar to in vivo coding is emotion coding, which 
categorizes chunks of information into descriptive emotional code words. Value coding, 
in terms of beliefs and attitudes about the military and their response, is another type of 
coding that was used.   
Definitions 
Far-right terrorist: a terrorist who subscribes to a political ideology that is 
opposed to all forms of government (Gruenewald, Chermak, & Freilich, 2013). 
Gun free zone: law prohibiting guns on school grounds or within 1,000 feet of a 
school; in common usage, refers to any place where guns are prohibited by law (Crime 
Control Act of 1990). 
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Homegrown terrorist: a terrorist who attacks their country of origin or their 
country of residence (Brooks, 2011). 
Lone wolf terrorist: an individual or small group of autonomous individuals who 
plan and execute politically motivated violent attacks (Kaplan, Loow, & Malkki, 2014; 
Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011).  
Mass public shooting: a shooting that occurs in a public place and involves the 
killing or injuring of two or more people by the shooting (Lott, 2010). 
Mass killing: the killing of four or more people in one episode (Fox & DeLateur, 
2014). 
Radical thinkers: individuals whose beliefs and feelings have changed so that 
they increasingly support one side of a political conflict (McCauley & Moskalenko, 
2014). 
Radical actors: radical thinkers who take action; often violent; based upon their 
beliefs and feelings (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014). 
Soft targets: locations that have minimal levels of physical security; i.e. a 
shopping mall (Barnes, 2012). 
Assumptions 
Assumptions exist both in the conceptual framework and in the methodology of 
this study. First, in the research purpose I assumed that the lived experiences of the Fort 
Hood survivors will have gained insight into improving a sense of security on military 
bases. I also assumed that the suggestions for improving the sense of safety for the 
survivors will be beneficial to the entire military organization if implemented. These 
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assumptions are necessary because the research is attempting to use detailed descriptions 
of experiences to inform future security suggestions. 
The community based approach to public health and safety states that policies in 
the area of health and safety are best made when the community takes part in the policy 
decisions (Nilsen, 2006). Furthermore, the framework states that the community serves as 
both the catalyst and targets of the policies within an organization. 
I must assume that the community based approach theory is transferrable to this 
research because the main purpose of the research is to describe how the lone wolf terror 
attack affects the life and work experiences of these survivors and what can be done to 
increase their sense of security while on base. Finally, to initiate positive social change 
for members of the military with the results of the study, I must assume that participants 
are being honest and forthright. 
Scope and Delimitations 
In this study, I examined the effect of a lone wolf terrorist attack on the lived 
experiences of military soldiers to gain insight as to what actions could lead to these 
survivors regaining their sense of security while on duty. The interviews only included 
survivors of the attack at Fort Hood, Texas in 2009. I used participants who were active 
base Army soldiers and were injured by the perpetrator of the attack. This study was 
focused on the effect on their sense of safety prior to and after the attack, their actual 
experience during the attack, and how those experiences affected their life and work, 
including personal relationships with other members of the military. During the study, I 
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asked participants to reflect on the 2016 DoD policy change regarding the carrying of 
personal weapons and how a sense of security for soldiers can be increased or regained. 
Victims of other lone wolf terror attacks, such as at military recruiting centers or 
against non-military targets, were not considered because this study sought to determine 
the effect of a lone wolf attack on a location where individuals normally feel secure and 
protected from the outside. The victims of the 2013 shooting at the Navy shipyard were 
not included because the perpetrator of that shooting was not motivated by a religious or 
political motive and therefore does not meet the definition of a terrorist. Attacks on the 
military that occurred outside of the United States were also excluded. 
I chose phenomenology as the method of inquiry for this research. Instead of 
creating a survey regarding safety and security and then using a quantitative method to 
determine the effect of this attack on military, I attempted to create a rich, detailed 
description of the phenomena of surviving a lone wolf terror attack as a member of the 
U.S. Army while on base. I selected Fort Hood because it is a domestic military base and 
had the largest number of surviving victims from a lone wolf terror attack. 
Limitations 
There were several limitations to this research. First, the number of potential 
participants were limited due to the small number of the total population. The 
phenomenon itself has not been experienced by more than a few dozen individuals. 
Furthermore, it is possible that the study participants experienced the phenomenon of 
surviving a lone wolf terror attack while on duty differently from the majority of others 
who might have experienced the same phenomenon.  
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Another limitation was the military branch of the participants. Members of 
various branches may experience the same phenomenon another way based upon a 
variety of differences which exist within the four branches of the armed forces and the 
individual factors which played a role in the participants choosing the Army over other 
branches.  
Additionally, personal biases on the part of myself and participants may have 
limited the scope of the research. The issue of concealed carry on military bases to 
increase a sense of safety, the best means of preventing lone wolf terrorism, and the true 
threat of lone wolf terror are all politically charged issues. I am a strong supporter of the 
military and have many family members who served in multiple branches. Furthermore, I 
believe that members of the military should be allowed to carry weapons for personal 
protection while on duty. I addressed this bias through the use of neutral language 
questions that asked for the participant to describe their thoughts and feelings. I only 
asked probing or clarifying questions from the participant responses. 
The views and political ideology of the participants also posed limitations for the 
research. In order to combat this limitation, the interviews focused on personal 
experiences and reactions to the event and current DoD firearms and security policy. 
Additionally, open ended questions were used to explore suggestions for regaining a 
sense of security while on base for these individuals instead of predetermined options. 
Finally, the research was limited by the choice of participants. Purposeful 
sampling, which is a valid and useful sampling method for phenomenological inquiry, 
was utilized for this research (Maxwell, 2013, p. 97). Purposeful sampling was necessary 
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due to the low number of the overall population (31) and being able to locate survivors 
via Facebook (23).  
Significance of the Study 
The knowledge gained as a scholar practitioner is beneficial in promoting positive 
social change. In this research, understanding the effect of military policy can be utilized 
to advocate for stronger policies within the larger organization of all of the United States 
Armed Forces in order to better protect the lives of military personnel. Scholarship and 
advocacy are part of the social change model of knowledge and skills (Callahan et al., 
2001). Improved security policy could result in not only higher levels of safety from lone 
wolf terror attacks, but also empower members of the military when they are not in close 
proximity to military police or other members of the security forces. This empowerment 
would be especially relevant for military recruiters, who are left isolated from military 
bases and are much easier to access by the public than are proper military installations 
which have fences or other barriers in addition to armed guards at each entry gate 
(Schogol, 2015). It could also empower those military members who do not feel 
physically able to defend themselves in certain situations due to their size or other factors 
(Lott, 2010). Security policy change could not only prevent casualties in lone wolf 
terrorism scenarios, but also other forms of crime that can occur on military bases 
including but not limited to sexual assault (Lott, 2010). 
The major significance of the study was that the survivors gave a voice to a group 
of people personally effected by terrorist attacks on American soil that has yet to be heard 
in a meaningful manner as it pertains to scholarly research. This information can lead to 
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effective security policy, better understanding of the impact of lone wolf terror, and 
enhanced protection for our soldiers who serve their country. These changes can lead to 
healthier professional lives, longer careers, and perhaps a decrease in incidents of terrorist 
attacks on domestic military targets.  
Significance to Practice 
Despite enhancements to the capabilities of law enforcement enacted by the 
United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT ACT), detecting lone wolf and home grown 
terrorist plots remains a difficult task due to lack of detectable communication from 
potential terrorists to those already monitored by the United States (Brooks, 2011; 
Mantri, Spring 2011; Nacos, 2012). Therefore, in order to mitigate loss and/or deter 
domestic lone wolf attacks on military targets, other methods to protect the men and 
women of the military have been considered.  
One such method for accomplishing the goal of increased protection and security 
for military personnel is the new 2016 DoD directive allowing military members to carry 
personally owned weapons for personal protection given that they pass a background 
check. According to Lott (2010), handgun carry permits have a long history of reducing 
violent crime. Lott has spent several decades studying the issue of guns and crime 
deterrence. Most relevant to the present study is Lott’s analysis of mass public shootings. 
Mass public shootings are defined “as one that occurred in a public place and involved 
two or more people either killed or injured by the shooting” (Lott 2010, p. 103). This 
definition excludes gang related activity, organized crime, serial killings, or killings that 
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occurred over one day apart (Lott 2010, p. 103). When analyzing mass public shootings, 
the results show that the “mean per capita death rate” in states with concealed carry 
permits dropped 69 percent (Lott 2010, p. 105). Additionally, in 1998, Lott (2010) found 
that the more concealed permits were issued within a state, the more crime was reduced 
(p. 156-157). Finally, as Lott (2010) continued his study into 2008, his research shows 
that these trends hold fast and even apply to deterring acts of terrorism and in mitigating 
the losses of terrorist acts (p. 321-325). However, the decision to change the weapons 
policy is not without its detractors within top leadership of the armed forces (McGarry, 
2016). Additionally, it is not known if there are other viable options to increase a sense of 
security and possibly prevent lone wolf attacks that would be more effective and perhaps 
less controversial than allowing military member to carry personally owned weapons. 
In this study, my results provide insight into the potential effectiveness of the 
revised 2016 DoD weapons policy in increasing or regaining a sense of safety in addition 
to highlighting alternative means for accomplishing this goal. 
Significance to Theory 
The conclusions of this research can lead to a better understanding of how 
military victims of lone wolf attacks experience the event. This knowledge can be 
compared to other studies of civilians and their survival experiences from lone wolf terror 
attacks. This comparison can help develop theories related to how different types of 
people experience surviving terror attacks.  
Furthermore, the suggestions for regaining or increasing a sense of safety from 
this research could lead to the development of military security policies. The success or 
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failure of these new policies could lead to new theory specifically related to issues of 
safety, security, and preventing or deterring lone wolf terrorism.  
Significance to Social Change 
The fulfillment of the purpose of this research can help determine whether the 
military men and women most effected by lone wolf terror attacks can utilize their 
experiences and knowledge to suggest options for regaining or increasing a sense of 
security while on duty for these victims. The potential positive social change is the 
enhanced sense of personal security for those men and women who serve in the military 
and the potential loss of life in a lone wolf terrorist attack. This research is important for 
all members of the military, our elected officials, policy makers, and any person who has 
a connection to the armed forces. These results can positively impact the lives of 
hundreds of thousands of American soldiers, their families, and those whom they serve. 
In the best case scenario, lone wolf attacks against the military would prevented entirely. 
Summary 
Terrorism, specifically lone wolf terrorism, has become an increasingly 
troublesome concern for homeland security due to the success of online radicalization, 
homegrown terrorists with no prior connections to terrorism, and the difficulty for law 
enforcement to detect lone wolf plots (Barnes, 2012; Brooks, 2011; Neumann, 2013).  
Several lone wolf terror attacks since 2009 have targeted military personnel 
located on military installations or at military recruiting centers (Moskalenko & 
McCauley, 2011; Keneally, Margolin, Martinez, & Thomas, 2015). Due to a 1992 DoD 
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directive, military personnel are banned from carrying weapons for personal protection 
while on a military installation.  
In 1992, the DoD issued a directive that restricted all non-security military 
personnel from carrying weapons unless a direct threat to their life was imminent 
(Department of Defense, 1992). In November 2016, the DoD updated this policy to allow 
military personnel to carry personally owned concealed weapons with prior approval 
(Department of Defense, 2016). This policy change is intended to increase security on 
bases and at recruiting centers and to prevent casualties from lone wolf terror attacks. The 
effect of the policy change on military personnel is unknown. 
 The problem was that research had not addressed the lived experiences for 
survivors of lone wolf attacks or how the experiences might inform military policy 
regarding regaining or increasing a sense of safety for the military men and women 
charged with protecting America at home and abroad.  
This dissertation utilized a qualitative phenomenological study to determine how 
the 2009 Fort Hood shooting affected the life and work of the soldiers who survived the 
attack. In this study, I described, in thorough detail, the lived experiences of these 
military men and women and to gain their understanding and suggestions for improving 







Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The problem was that research has not addressed the lived experiences for 
survivors of lone wolf attacks or how the experiences could inform military policy 
regarding a sense of safety for the military men and women charged with protecting 
America at home and abroad.  
The purpose of this study was to establish a need for measures to address threats 
to the security of armed forces personnel from lone wolf attacks, to provide a rich, 
detailed description of survivors’ experiences of the 2009 attack at Fort Hood, and to 
identify their reflections on how to improve military personnel’s sense of security while 
on duty. 
Researchers have focused on many aspects of terrorism and gun restrictions. 
Spurred by high profile attacks such as 9/11, the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, and the 2013 
Boston Marathon bombing, terrorism research has attempted to address issues regarding 
the motivations of terrorism, the psychology of lone wolf terrorists, and the recruitment 
of future terrorists, homegrown terrorism, and the law enforcement response to terrorism 
in general and in combating lone wolf terrorism (Barnes, 2012; Becker, 2014; Brooks, 
2011). Other literature has focused on the impact of concealed carry permits being 
allowed on university campuses which have traditionally been gun free zones (Bouffard, 
Nobles, Wells, & Cavanaugh, 2012). This research could help predict the impact of 
concealed carry on military bases. 
In this chapter, I describe the research strategies to identify current terrorism 
research and how the research has been utilized in past terrorism research. I also present 
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an in depth review of the current literature regarding terrorism, lone wolf attacks, and gun 
policy. 
Literature Search Strategy 
Using the Walden University Library for database access, I used the Political 
Science Complete, Sage Premier, Academic Search Complete, ProQuest Central, 
Homeland Security Digital Library, Google Scholar, PSYCInfo, and the Military and 
Government Collection to gather research literature. I used the following search terms 
and term combinations: United States and Terrorism, Terrorism, Lone-wolf terrorism, 
counterterrorism, Psychology of Terrorism, United States Military security policy, 
homegrown terrorism, domestic terrorism, gun control, online radicalization, victims and 
terrorism, experiences and terrorism, effects and terrorism, community based approach 
and terrorism, and survivors and terrorism. 
I searched each database using the terms/term combinations listed above. I then 
studied the abstract for relevant results to determine if the research was relevant to this 
study.  
Conceptual Framework 
 The conceptual framework for this study was based upon the idea that policies 
intended to provide safety to military personnel and to prevent and deter lone wolf terror 
attacks are best constructed when the lived experiences of victims of these attacks are 
taken into account. Engaging the survivors of Fort Hood, detailing their experiences, and 
obtaining their knowledge and ideas regarding improving military personnel’s sense of 
security while on base will better inform policy. Policy decisions in the military are made 
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with a top-down approach, but considerations of these survivors could lead to better 
policy decisions and outcomes. Furthermore, knowing their attacker both personally and 
professionally makes the Fort Hood attack different than the majority of terror attacks. 
Regaining a sense of security is especially difficult since the perpetrator was a fellow 
soldier. 
 These concepts stem from the theory of a community based approach to public 
health. This theory is based upon seven principles needed to develop policies that will 
“enhance health and safety” (Nilsen, 2006, p. 140). The seven principles identified are: 
(a) communities being both the target and catalyst for policy, (b) community member 
participation, (c) intersectional collaboration, (d) substantial resource requirements, (e) 
long term program view, (f) multifaceted interventions, and (g) population outcome 
(Nilsen, 2006). I believe that these principles to improve public health and safety is 
transferrable to the problem and purpose of my research.  
Literature Review 
While terrorism has been the subject of academic research for decades, the subject 
has become increasingly researched in academia in the years since the attacks of 9/11 
(Gruenewald, Chermak, & Freilich, 2013). Despite this upward trend, there is still a need 
for more research into the general topic of terrorism (Gruenewald, et al., 2013, p. 1007). 
Even more important is the need for research into the subset of terrorism known as lone 
wolf terrorism, where research is rarely conducted (Gruenewald, et al., 2013, p. 1007). 
The literature regarding the issue of terrorism can be categorized into several groups. 
First, researchers have studied the profiles of individuals who join terror groups to 
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include their characteristics and motivations. Second, researchers have studied the 
differences between terror groups and lone wolf terrorists both in characteristics and 
motivations. Finally, research has studied the law enforcement response toward the goal 
of preventing and combating terrorism. In this literature review, I analyzed current 
methods of determent and prevention and identified their deficiencies when dealing with 
lone wolf terrorism. One of the purposes of my research was to help identify better ways 
to protect members of the United States military from these attacks. I believe that the 
1992 DoD directive banning the carrying of weapons for all non-security military 
personnel was deficient and that the current policy is a step in the right direction, but not 
the most comprehensive solution. The following literature review shows that there is a 
need for increased security measures for military personnel in light of the difficulties 
surrounding lone wolf terrorism deterrence and prevention. 
The main area of terrorism research involves the study of terrorist groups. These 
studies mostly focus on how terrorists act and think (Cottee & Hayward, 2011), profiles 
of terrorist psychology and motivations for action (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014), and 
response and prevention techniques and strategies to be utilized by law enforcement, 
government agencies, and the military (Barnes, 2012; Brooks, 2011; Coultas, 2015; 
Hewitt, 2014; Neumann, 2013). Only in the last few years has terrorism research begin to 
focus research on the phenomenon of lone wolf terrorism, despite its prevalence in past 
decades (Gruenewald, et al., 2013; Phillips, 2012). The vast majority of the research into 
terrorism seeks to offer the means by which society can better protect itself through 
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understanding of the threat and identifying the most effective means for combating the 
threat (Coultas, 2015; Cusumano & Kinsey, 2015). 
One of the key aspects to consider is the motivating factors behind why 
individuals choose to join terrorist groups. Most terrorism researchers have studied how 
individuals who create and/or join terrorist groups think and act rather than how they feel 
(Cottee & Hayward, 2011, pp. 963-964). Understanding the motives behind choosing 
terrorism offers insight into identifying and understanding individuals who may be prone 
to joining a terrorist movement. This information is an integral piece to identify potential 
terrorists before they execute a plan of attack.  
Terrorism is normatively defined as having a political and/or ideological 
component. However, there is an existential paradigm related to terrorist motivations in 
addition to the political (Cottee & Hayward, 2011). There are three significant non-
political motives that can explain why an individual becomes a terrorist. These existential 
motives are: adventure (or excitement), to create meaning in their life, or to find glory 
through their actions. While these motives do not fully explain why individuals become 
terrorists, they do contribute to the overall schema of terrorist individuals (Cottee & 
Hayward, 2011, p. 966). 
The latter two of these three existential motives for terrorism relate to lone wolf 
terrorists’ reasons for committing acts of violence. Terrorist groups offer identity and 
meaning to the members of their organization, which serves as a pull factor in recruiting 
individuals to the terrorist cause. The group often offers a means for understanding the 
world and how the individual terrorist fits into the larger scheme of the world (Cottee & 
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Hayward, 2011, p. 973). This emotional connection is similar to the emotional connection 
that soldiers often develop while serving in the military, especially in combat situations. 
Participation is this type of group dynamics creates a strong positive bond of love, 
admiration, and purpose not found in other aspects of life and therefore encourages 
individuals to sacrifice their life for the other members of their group (Cottee & 
Hayward, 2011, pp. 973-975).  
Additionally, the emotions experienced in fighting for a grand and glorious cause 
can be a significant factor in an individual’s choice to join a terrorist group (Cottee & 
Hayward, 2011, p. 975). The glory and honor in defending such honorable causes creates 
a validity to the individual sense of self and creates the identity of a hero who is 
defending victims of suffering. Such emotions are commonplace for the jihadists inspired 
by al Qaeda and other groups of their ilk (Cottee & Hayward, 2011, pp. 976-977). 
The existential emotional causes of terrorism may offer an explanation as to why 
established methods for assessing individual potential for violent crimes do not easily 
translate to identifying those who could become potential terrorists (Monahan, 2012). 
Regarding utilizing risk assessment methods of terrorism, only two general areas engage 
in the endeavor: interrogation of accused terrorists and in the hiring process for sensitive 
positions within the DoD (Monahan, 2012, p. 168).  
After the 2009 Fort Hood shooting, when Major Nidal Hasan killed 13 and 
wounded 32--all but two of whom were members of the military--Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates ordered an investigation to identify ways that this attack could have been 
prevented by having methods in place to identify potential security risks for military 
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personnel. While the outcome of this review did not change the DoD directive regarding 
the carrying of weapons, it did recommend that the DoD begin to utilize violence risk 
assessment tools developed by academics toward their identification of potential internal 
threats within the ranks of the military (Monahan, 2012). While using risk assessment 
tools for “commanders, supervisors, and professional support” would prevent future 
attacks similar to those perpetuated by Major Hasan, it would do nothing to prevent an 
outside lone wolf terrorist from inflicting violence upon members of the military on base 
or at a recruiting center (Monahan, 2012, p. 170). 
The recommendation to implement a risk assessment tool for the members of the 
military seems valid, but the question is whether or not the risk assessment tools used for 
identifying potentially violent individuals will correlate to the identification of 
individuals likely to join a terrorist movement or become lone wolf terrorists. Subsequent 
academic research into this question determined that the four dimensions utilized to 
identify risk factors for violent crime--“criminal history, irresponsible lifestyle, 
psychopathy and criminal attitudes, and substance abuse”--did not apply to terrorists 
(Monahan, 2012, p. 179).  
There are several substantial reasons as to why the risk assessments for common 
violence do not correlate to terrorism. The first problematic issue is that terrorism does 
not conform to this risk assessment model due to terrorism’s heterogeneity. In fact, no 
studies have ever been able to identify personality traits that clearly distinguish those 
individuals who commit terrorist acts from those who do not (Monahan, 2012, p. 179). 
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There exist many different types of terrorists, each type having different goals, 
characteristics, motivations, and targets (Monahan, 2012, p. 180). 
Another problematic issue is that the sample size of individuals who actually 
engage in terrorism is not likely to become large enough to establish a statistically 
significant quantitative relationship between risk factors primarily because compared to 
common violence, incidents of terrorism are relatively rare (Monahan, 2012, p. 183). 
Existence of unique risk factors associated with terrorism pose an additional problem in 
correlating violence risk assessment to terrorist potential. Three fourths of the risk factors 
associated with common violence are not found in the risk factors of terrorism (Monahan, 
2012, p. 184). Due to the failure of existing risk assessments to accurately predict and 
individual’s potential for terrorism, specific risk factors for terrorism need to be 
identified.  Several researchers have attempted to accomplish this task and several 
overlapping risk factors have emerged. These risk factors include: “ideology, affiliations, 
grievances, and moral emotions” (Monahan, 2012, p. 186). 
Ideology as a risk factor means that the individual adheres to a belief system in 
which extreme measures for system advocacy are promoted and the willingness to resort 
to violence in order to achieve an end exist. This form of ideology has been dubbed 
“militant extremism” (Monahan, 2012, 186).  
The second identified risk factor is that of affiliations. Individuals who join 
terrorist groups rarely do so as loners. Typically, they join such groups with friends 
and/or family. A total of 90% of al Qaeda members joined the group with either a friend 
or family member (Monahan, 2012, p. 188).  
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Third, grievances play an import role in the motivations for terrorism. Grievances 
normatively stem from a perceived wrong done to a person and/or a group. Terrorists 
often view themselves either as a victim or as protecting others who are important to 
them (Monahan, 2012, p. 189). 
Finally, moral emotions are a key indicator for terrorism risk. Moral emotion 
refers to a belief that the terrorist is being targeted by an outside force that seeks to 
destroy their way of life or who threatens their sense of what is sacred (Monahan, 2012, 
p. 191). This risk factor was definitely relevant to the case of Major Nidal Hasan and the 
other Muslim individuals who attacked recruiting centers, who viewed the American 
military as a threat to their religion and culture. 
Therefore, it is clear that further research into the risk factors and assessment tools 
for identifying potential terrorists is necessary to prevent these individuals from joining 
the military. However, the more difficult threat to identify is the one posed by lone wolf 
terrorists (Bates, 2012; Kaplan, Loow, & Malkki, 2014; Teich, 2013). While preventing 
people who pose these risks from joining the military is essential, it will not prevent an 
attack from an individual from outside the military.  
The majority of historical research into terrorism has focused on group terrorism 
and the types of individuals who join these groups. However, the trend of domestic 
terrorism in the United States has evolved from threats of organized terror groups such as 
the Ku Klux Klan to threats from lone wolf terrorists (Gruenewald, et al., 2013). Lone 
wolf terrorists are individuals or autonomous cells who plan and execute politically 
motivated attacks (Kaplan, et al., 2014). These individuals represent a different, unique 
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subset of terrorists which need to be better understood. Unfortunately, quality research 
into lone wolf terrorism are few in number (Gruenewald, et al., 2013, p. 1007). 
As terrorism in the United States evolved from group terrorism to lone wolf 
attacks, several trends have emerged in the profile of these terrorists and in the perceived 
threat that they represent to law enforcement. Lone wolf attacks surpassed group 
terrorism attacks in number and the majority of these attacks were perpetrated by right-
wing racists and was “particularly deadly” (Gruenewald, et al., 2013, p. 1010). Therefore, 
it follows that far-right terrorists were perceived by law enforcement to be a larger threat 
than jihadists or left-wing terrorists (Gruenewald, et al., 2013). Additionally, in contrast 
to members of group terrorism, the incidence of mental illness in these individuals was 
quite high (Gruenewald, et al., 2013, p. 1010).  
Furthermore, the incidence of lone wolf terrorism in the United States accounted 
for about forty percent of all lone wolf terrorist attacks from 1968 to 2007 (Gruenewald, 
et al., 2013, p. 1010). These facts highlight the increased threat that these individuals 
pose to the security of many Americans. The number of lone wolf attacks in the United 
States appears to be increasing as time progresses (Gruenewald, et al., 2013, p. 1010) but 
since 2001, the nature of lone wolves has shifted from far-right terrorists to jihadists 
(Gruenewald, et al., 2013, p. 1014). The changing trend coupled with the law 
enforcement perception that far-right terrorists pose a greater threat may partly explain 
how several jihadists have gone undetected prior to their attacks.  
The methods utilized by lone wolf terrorism are also changing. Notorious far-right 
terrorists such as Timothy McVeigh and Ted Kaczynski used bombs in their terrorist 
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attacks while more recent far-right terrorists, such as Jared Loughner, used guns. 
Jihadists’, such as Major Hasan and the Tsarnaev brothers, in America have used both 
tactical methods with varying degrees of success. Additionally, mass shootings in 
America have become a growing concern in society, law enforcement, and public policy 
beginning with the Columbine High School shootings in 1999 (Fox & DeLateur, 2014). 
Most troubling is the possibility of lone wolf terrorists using weapons of mass 
destruction, specifically biological and industrial chemicals and gases, to execute their 
attacks (Ellis, 2014).  
As the trend toward jihadists being the perpetrators of increasing lone wolf attacks 
in the United States, research seeking to identify the driving factors of these individuals 
and subsequently how we can prevent terror attacks is vital. Lone wolf terrorism presents 
a unique problem for researchers attempting to describe the motivators of terrorist 
activity due to the fact that lone wolf terrorists do not fit the “free rider” problem from 
the economic model, which states that people will choose not to sacrifice themselves for 
a public good that will benefit others (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014, p. 73). Multiple 
research studies offer distinct approaches in order to explain terrorist behavior. 
Lone wolf terrorists normatively self-sacrifice for the goals of a larger group 
(Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011). This action contradicts the free rider principle, which 
would posit that individuals would not sacrifice themselves for the benefit of those they 
do not know. Instead, they would be likely to “free ride” off of the sacrifice of others. 
However, lone wolf terrorists are often not directly associated with larger terror groups 
and have different motivating factors, especially for jihadists, so the free rider situation 
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does not apply to them (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011, p. 123). Instead, the actions of 
these lone wolf individuals can be explained by the evolutionary traits of altruism and 
strong reciprocity (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011, p. 121). Altruism and strong 
reciprocity refers to how people function in groups. In groups, there are advantages to 
cooperation. The person who sacrifices today may be the benefit of sacrifice tomorrow. 
However, altruists in the groups lose as more and more people cheat this system. 
Therefore, strong reciprocity refers to the principles of cooperation and punishment. In 
groups, those who do not cooperate will be punished. In the case of lone wolf terrorists, 
they implement justice by punishing people who do not cooperate. They are willing to 
pay for the wrong done to another (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011). 
Altruism and strong reciprocity do not explain all lone wolves, however. Another 
motivating factor to consider is the influence of group identification. Group identification 
refers to the phenomenon of individuals who identify with a larger group or ideology that 
instills positive feelings when the larger group is “safe and prospering” (Moskalenko & 
McCauley, 2011, p. 122). When these groups or members of the ideology are viewed as 
being the victims of a wrong and targets of injustice, lone wolf individuals will self-
sacrifice to help the larger group (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011, p. 122). This 
identification encourages lone wolves to seek methods to inflict retribution to those 
targets deemed responsible for the victimization. In other words, for lone wolf terrorists, 
the political becomes personal (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011). Lone wolf terrorists do 
not “lose sight of self-interest; rather, their self-interest is outweighed by group interest” 
(Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011, p. 124). 
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Since the free rider problem does not apply, law enforcement must build a profile 
of those individuals likely to become radicalized and subsequently act on those radical 
beliefs. Many people are willing to pay for the wrong doing done to a third part and many 
people also identify the self with larger groups, but the vast majority of these individuals 
do not become lone wolf terrorists (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011). In other words, we 
know that only a small percentage of radical thinkers become radical actors. Therefore, 
identifying the factors which lead a radical thinker to becoming a radical actor is 
paramount for lone wolf terrorism prevention and deterrence (McCauley & Moskalenko, 
2014).  
The pyramid of opinion and the pyramid of action were created to show varying 
levels of radicalization using radical Islamic global jihad as the lens. There are four basic 
tenets of the global jihad lens. The first belief is that the West is at war with Islam; the 
second belief is that the jihadists are merely protecting Islam; the third belief is that these 
actions are justified and moral; and finally that it is the base of all believers of Islam to 
support these actions (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014, pp. 70-71). Therefore, the four 
levels of the radical opinion pyramid are: neutral, sympathizers, justifiers, and personal 
moral obligation (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014, pp. 70-71).  
The action radicalization pyramid has four corresponding levels: inert (no action 
taken), activists (non-violent means for change), radicals (those who believe violence is 
sometimes or often justified), and terrorists (those who actually execute violent attacks) 
(McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014, p. 73). One of the problems with these pyramids is that 
possessing radical belief does not strongly correlate with taking radical action. Two Pew 
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research polls of American Muslims taken in 2007 and 2011 revealed that eight percent 
of American Muslims believe that violence against civilian targets is sometimes or often 
justified (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014, p. 71). Eight percent of the approximately one 
million American Muslims results in about 80,000 American Muslims who believe 
civilian violence can be justified to defend Islam. Similar results have been obtained by 
research of British Muslims living in the United Kingdom (McCauley & Moskalenko, 
2014, p. 72). However, only one in a hundred UK Muslims have attempted violent action 
and there have only been a few hundred terrorism related arrests in the United States 
since 9/11 (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014, p. 72). Either the remaining American and 
British Muslims are waiting to take violent action or there is another factor which plays 
into the movement from radical opinion to radical action. 
Four common characteristics among school shooters and assassins are: the 
presence of a grievance, either personal or political; symptoms of clinical depression; 
unfreezing, which is an event which causes disconnection of the self or feelings of 
isolation; and experience with weapons (McCauley, Moskalenko, & Van Son, 2013). 
These four characteristics offer both the means, the motive, and the opportunity for 
action. Four common characteristics of individuals who join terror groups include: 
personal or political grievance, slippery slope, risk and status seeking, and unfreezing 
(McCauley, Moskalenko, & Van Son, 2013). Slippery slope refers to “a gradual 
desensitization to the idea and experience of violence through slow escalation of illegal 
and violent acts” (McCauley, Moskalenko, & Van Son, 2013, p. 8). Risk and status 
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seeking is highly correlated with young males who see violence as the best path for 
money and/or success (McCauley, Moskalenko, & Van Son, 2013).  
Therefore, overlapping characteristics of school shooters and assassins with 
individuals who join terror groups creates two profile combinations that help explain how 
individuals with radical opinions become radical actors of lone wolf terrorism. The first 
profile is called disconnected-disordered and the second profile is called caring-
consistency (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014, p. 83). The first profile describes 
individuals who possess either a personal or political grievance coupled with experience 
with guns and a sense of disconnection from society. The second profile describes 
individuals who possess high levels of empathy toward others who are suffering coupled 
with a sense of personal responsibility to reverse the suffering (McCauley & 
Moskalenko, 2014). Taken together, the most reliable predictor of lone wolf terrorism is 
an individual with radical beliefs who also has the means and opportunity to take radical 
action (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014). 
Despite narrowing the profile for jihadist lone wolf terrorists, the fact remains that 
lone wolf terrorism remains a growing threat to society and has proven very difficult for 
law enforcement to detect (Bates, 2012; Brinkley, 2013; Hewitt, 2014; Kaplan, Loow, & 
Malkki, 2014; Teich, 2013). Subsequently, we must explore varying strategies to deter 
and prevent terrorism while analyzing and evaluating the effectiveness of the current law 
enforcement response to lone wolf terrorism. 
One strategy of note is to utilize the economic model of risk and reward in order 
to deter individuals, who possess both radical opinion and the means and opportunity, to 
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take radical action. Applying the risk and reward model toward deterring lone wolf 
terrorism would involve increasing the risk associated with these attacks while 
simultaneously reducing the reward associated with attempting the attack (Phillips, 
2012). Effective means for law enforcement preventing lone wolf terrorism is predicated 
upon decreasing this ratio because an increase in this ratio leads to the precipitation of 
lone wolf attacks (Phillips, 2012, p. 10). 
Lone wolf terrorists are most likely to use guns or bombs in their attack plans 
choose time and places that are efficient for reaching their goals (Phillips, 2012, p. 10). In 
other words, lone wolves look for the time and place that will maximize the amount of 
human casualties. When analyzing the lone wolf attacks cited by this study, several 
common characteristics emerge. First, the targets of each attack where members of the 
armed forces at their respective base stations. Second, the motivations for the attack were 
related to American policy and military action toward radical Islam. A sense of personal 
responsibility to defend Islam, and in the case of Major Nidal Hasan, coupled with an 
unfreezing moment, motivated these individuals to take action against people who 
represented a threat to Islam (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014). Lastly, each location was 
effectively rendered a gun free zone by the DoD directive at the center of this study. 
In order to apply the risk/reward economic model to these shootings, we must 
examine current practices of law enforcement to identify, deter, and prevent lone wolf 
attacks. At present, I would suggest that the easiest method for decreasing the risk/reward 
ratio is to allow all military personnel the opportunity to carry a weapon for personal 
protection, which the updated directive allows. Additionally, this policy change should be 
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made public knowledge and notices posted at all recruitment centers. The presence of 
armed resistance would decrease the reward of the attack while increasing the risk. Long 
term analysis has shown a direct correlation between the passage of civilian concealed 
carry laws and violent crime reduction (Lott, 2010). It follows that allowing military 
personnel the same opportunity would result in the same direct correlation. Furthermore, 
outsourcing armed security details for diplomats and other high level dignitaries is a 
common method for protecting individuals and this principle could be modified to apply 
to military installations as well (Cusumano & Kinsey, 2015). 
However, an important aspect of countering terrorism must be the community 
itself. Community based policing approaches have been utilized in concert with counter-
terrorism forces in both the UK and the United States (Spalek, 2014). The approaches are 
aimed at engaging the Muslim community to begin to fight terrorism from within the 
communities that these terrorists live and work (Spalek, 2014). While these approaches 
have been met with limited success, they have not included a community based approach 
from the target communities in terms of policy decisions. 
Traditional top-down approaches to counter terrorism include identifying group 
leaders, intercepting messages, and investigating individuals on watch lists (Becker, 
2014; Coultas, 2015). These methods are insufficient to combat lone wolves due to their 
isolated nature. Crowdsourcing has emerged as a method of identifying and deterring 
lone wolf terrorists (Coultas, 2015). Crowdsourcing is a method where potentially 
millions of people “contribute knowledge, expertise, or skills” toward a common goal 
(Coultas, 2015, p. 1).  
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Using crowdsourcing to combat terrorism would be akin to a grass roots or 
bottom-up approach where information from citizens is channeled to the proper federal 
authorities in a streamlined manner. Initiating an information gathering system based 
upon the principle of crowdsourcing could have potential benefits to deterring lone 
wolves. These benefits include creating citizen buy-in as active participants in the war on 
terror, which would increase the quality and quantity of intelligence; and using existing 
crowdsourcing technology to streamline information based upon priority in an efficient 
time frame to the proper authorities (Coultas, 2015). The “local expertise” of the average 
citizen would expand the ability to identify individuals and potentially uncover plots to 
commit acts of terror (Coultas, 2015, p. 6).  
Since crowdsourcing is an accepted part of the digital world, it would be easier to 
integrate this method of data collected because it would not be run by a government 
agency and would not present a governmental intrusion into the personal lives of 
individuals living in America (Coultas, 2015).  
Developing new methods to deter lone wolf terrorism is paramount to public 
safety due to traditional approaches to countering group terrorism has proven to be 
inefficient regarding lone wolves (Becker, 2014). According to Lee (2015), there are 
currently four main policies that need to be evaluated and revised in response to lone 
wolf attacks such as the Fort Hood shooting and Boston Marathon bombing. 
The first policy to evaluate is the communication protocols between the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and state and local law enforcement (Lee, 2015). This 
recommendation was also part of the 9/11 Commission report as part of its 
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recommendation to increase communication between federal law enforcement agencies 
tasked with gathering intelligence such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the 
National Security Administration (NSA), and the FBI (National Commission On 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S., 2004). The FBI failed to properly inform local or state 
authorities of ongoing investigations and/or concerns regarding the perpetrators of the 
Fort Hood shooting and Boston Marathon bombing (Lee, 2015).  
The second policy for evaluation is granting access to state and local law 
enforcement agencies to monitor the internet activity of individuals when “reasonable 
suspicion” exists that these individuals may be a threat to public safety (Lee, 2015). In 
both the Fort Hood and Boston cases, the FBI possessed reasonable suspicion but did not 
contact local authorities nor allow them access to monitor electronic communication 
(Lee, 2015). 
The third policy involves integrating community engagement as part of the 
counter terrorism process. Such engagement not only builds trust between authorities and 
communities, but supports the tactic of utilizing the crowdsourcing method of deterrence 
(Coultas, 2015; Lee, 2015). The involvement of local communities is vital in creating a 
profile of individuals over time as opposed to the snap shots of lone wolf terrorists often 
taken by FBI assessments. These communities can give law enforcement a more 
comprehensive view of potential lone wolves by noting and reporting changes in 
behavior and/or attitudes (Lee, 2015). An outlet for communities to engage, perhaps 




Finally, the FBI’s automatically assumed lead role in investigations of potential 
lone wolves and in lone wolf attacks should not be taken for granted. Protocols should be 
evaluated since the current framework relegates “both the police department and the state 
sovereign to a subordinate and potentially isolated position” (Lee, 2015, p. 44). 
While lone wolf terrorism remains difficult to detect and is considered a 
significant and growing threat to society, not all research is in agreement as to what 
measures should be taken to prevent lone wolf attacks (Barnes, 2012; Mantri, 2011, 
Phillips, 2012). Even so, those researchers who disagree with the significance of the 
threat of lone wolf terrorism still concur with some other aspects of counterterrorism 
thought and research. For example, those who disagree about the significance of the lone 
wolf threat still recognize that the prevalence of homegrown lone wolf terrorists could be 
rising due to increased border security, the ability to obtain training and information from 
the internet, and the availability of firearms in the United States (Barnes, 2012, pp. 1629-
1630). Additionally, they recognize that an increase is radicalization of Islamic 
homegrown terrorists is occurring (Barnes, 2012, p. 1630) despite data regarding 
homegrown terror attacks since 9/11 revealing that there is no emerging pattern to 
suggest homegrown terrorism is on the rise or on the decline (Mantri, 2011). Media 
coverage of the events that do occur have given rise to a perception that the number of 
attacks is increasing (Mantri, 2011, p. 88). Finally, perspective agrees that by working as 
a homegrown lone wolf, these individuals effectively render diplomatic sanctions, the US 
military, Customs and Border Protection, and the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) without value (Barnes, 2012, p. 1630). 
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 Despite these acknowledgements, this perspective claims that combating lone 
wolf terrorism should not be a high priority among our federal, state, and local law 
enforcement communities due to the belief that lone wolf attacks do not pose a significant 
threat to the overall homeland security of the United States (Barnes, 2012; Mantri, Spring 
2011). The rationale behind this line of thinking is that since lone wolf terrorists operate 
in such isolation, current law enforcement methods are largely useless against the threat 
and any resources allocated toward stopping lone wolf terrorists is a waste of national 
security efforts. Furthermore, the isolating nature of lone wolfs severely limits their 
ability to execute large scale attacks that threaten national security (Barnes, 2012). An 
examination of the reasons behind the conclusion offer ample evidence as to the positive 
impact the carrying of weapons could have on lone wolf terrorism deterrence and 
success. The easy accessibility of items that can cause mass casualties such as “poisonous 
gas, flammable liquids, infectious organisms, and radioactive substances” makes the 
potential threat one that needs to be evaluated and combated (Ellis, 2014, p. 214). The 
threat from these substances is especially evident as targets with high civilian population 
and low security, such as sporting events, are being stressed by terror groups abroad 
(Spaaij & Hamm, 2015). 
The selection of targets for terror attacks, especially lone wolf attacks, follow 
certain characteristics which highlight the need for effective and efficient means of 
deterrents. Previously, it was assumed that lone wolves chose their targets in much the 
same way the group terrorists do (Becker, 2014). However, this assumption was untested 
and its accuracy “unclear” (Becker, 2014; Spaaij; 2010).  
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One point of commonality between group terror targets and lone wolf targets is 
based upon their ideology (Becker, 2014). Ideology; the beliefs, values, and objectives 
that drive our identity; “plays a dual role in driving terrorists’ actions” (Becker, 2014, p. 
961). The first role is to embrace terrorism and the second is to act out violence on targets 
which represent enemies of the ideology (Becker, 2014). On the surface it appears that 
ideology would limit the number of potential targets for group and/or lone wolf terror 
(Becker, 2014). For some types of terrorists, ideology would limit targets but for radical 
Islamic terrorists, this is not the case. Radical Islamic terror sees the entire Western world 
as the enemy, so civilian targets of any kind can be targeted. Attacks have included 
military targets, private employers, night club, marathons, and universities. 
Another factor in target selection for lone wolves involves their limited chance of 
success for large scale attacks on secure locations. Terrorists desire success in their 
operations and due to the limited resources and isolation of lone wolves, their attacks are 
often smaller in scope and involve less casualties than coordinated terror groups (Becker, 
2014). Therefore, lone wolves are most likely to select terror targets that represent their 
enemy that are found in areas that are familiar to them such as their neighborhood, 
workplace, or school (Becker, 2014). If an adequate target representative of the “enemy” 
is not found within familiar areas, they may choose to go outside their area for target 
selection (Becker, 2014, p. 963). For radical Islamic terrorists, civilian targets meet both 
criteria of familiarity and enemy representation. Most of these lone wolves target civilian 
populations located in areas that are likely to exert extreme psychological impact (fear of 
safety) on the community in addition to physical casualties (Becker, 2014). Targeting 
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marathon finish lines, nightclubs, armed forces installations, and places of work meet 
these ends. 
These types of targets represent the enemy of ideology, but are also locations 
where high levels of success are likely due to lack of security. Lone wolves are “weak 
opportunists” who look for places where there attacks are likely to be the easiest to 
execute (Becker, 2014, p. 971). Major Nidal Hasan committed his attack at work, the 
Tsaranev brothers at a public event, and Omar Mateen at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, 
FL. All of these locations were easily accessed locations with minimal levels of security 
or armed resistance. These trends are more troubling when you consider the focus of 
terrorists, both group and individuals, beginning to target and plot attacks on sporting 
events which represent not only the enemy culture, but also have a very large number of 
potential targets (Spaaij & Hamm, 2015). Furthermore, their odds for mass casualties 
increase substantially if weapons of mass destruction were to be utilized at these types of 
events. Using these types of weapons are within the scope of lone wolf capabilities and 
are part of the online radicalization efforts by terror groups to create homegrown 
terrorists (Ellis, 2014). 
Increasing security at every potential target is not a feasible option to prevent or 
deter lone wolf terror attacks (Becker, 2014). However, evidence from criminal studies 
indicates that the ability to carry concealed weapons leads to overall decreases in crime, 
especially violent crime (Lott, 2010). This evidence is part of the impetus for the DoD 
changing their policy regarding military personnel carrying weapons while one base. 
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Despite that evidence, the decision is controversial both inside the military and outside 
(Bouffard, Nobles, Wells, & Cavanaugh, 2012; Fox & DeLateur, 2013; McGarry, 2016). 
During a hearing on Capitol Hill in April 2016, General Mark Milley, the top 
Army officer, was questioned about attacks on recruiting centers and at Fort Hood. 
General Milley stated that he did not believe allowing personally owned concealed carry 
would be appropriate (McGarry, 2016). General Milley argued that force protection 
should be determined by local commanders for isolated posts such as recruiting centers 
and that on bases such as Fort Hood, the military security forces were ample protection 
for armed forces personnel (McGarry, 2016).  
In General Milley’s response to Senator Mike Lee’s question of concealed carry, 
he stated that the security forces response time to the Fort Hood shooting of about eight 
minutes was “that's pretty quick. And a lot of people died in the process of that. But that 
was a very fast, evolving event and I am not convinced from what I know that carrying 
privately owned weapons would have stopped that individual” (McGarry, 2016, para. 
14).  
Crossover themes exist between the characteristics of mass shooters and lone 
wolves such as revenge motivation, seeking power, or political grievance (Fox & 
DeLateur, 2014). According to Fox and DeLateur (2014), expanding right to carry 
concealed weapons laws or increasing security in schools will not be effective deterrents 
to mass shootings (p. 137-138). Other research has found ample evidence to suggest 
expansion of these laws will deter or prevent these types of incidences (Lott, 2010). It is 
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unclear how the new DoD directive will impact the incidence of lone wolf terror attacks 
or the lived experiences of military personnel. 
Prior to 9/11, the FBI was the primary organization tasked with counterterrorism. 
Their approach was largely reactive, meaning that they would investigate and apprehend 
terrorist activity after it had occurred (Barnes, 2012, p. 1632). The attacks of 9/11 
drastically altered counterterrorism measures, the manner in which terrorism was viewed, 
and gave new powers to law enforcement under the Uniting and Strengthening American 
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 
2001 (USA Patriot Act). This act also grouped several law enforcement agencies, such as 
Immigration and Naturalization (INS) and the US Border Patrol, under the newly created 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The USA Patriot Act renamed INS as 
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE).  
Since this transformation, law enforcement’s counterterrorism strategy has 
become proactive in identifying and deterring terrorist attacks. There are five categories 
of counterterrorism tools used by law enforcement. They are: use of confidential 
informants, surveillance (both electronically and with manpower), physical security of 
possible targets, restricted access to the means of executing attacks, and community 
efforts to combat radicalization (Barnes, 2012, p. 1630). While these tactics have been 
effective in identifying terrorist cells and plots in American that were directed by al 
Qaeda, they are largely ineffective for combating lone wolf terrorists. The main reason 
that these tactics are ineffective lies in their reliance on intercepting communication from 
suspected terrorists and established terrorist groups abroad. Confidential informants, 
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surveillance, and community engagement only work when prior knowledge about 
individuals or a plot exist. Since lone wolves operate in solitude, they are almost always 
operating under the radar of law enforcement.  
Restricting access to weapons and explosive devices is also a fruitless task for 
homegrown lone wolves because of the readily available supply of guns in the United 
States, both legally and illegally obtained, and combustible substances. Finally, physical 
protection of a target can normatively only be done when prior knowledge of an attack 
exits or the event has the resources available to it, such as a professional sporting event 
(Barnes, 2012, pp. 1650-1655). Physical protection of a target has been shown to be an 
effective means for counterterrorism, but the resources are not readily available to 
provide physical security for all potential targets. However, since the DoD directive was 
abolished, it follows potential military targets could immediately become physically 
protected at low or no cost to the government, therefore decreasing the risk/reward ratio 
of lone wolf terror attacks. However, this result is contingent on the willingness of 
military personnel to act on the directive change. 
Even though the data do not reveal an increase or decrease in the number of lone 
wolf attacks, there is still cause for concern. While the statistical likelihood of an 
American born Muslim becoming a terrorist is low, that number could rise with the 
continued success and/or advancement in methods available (Brooks, 2011, p. 10). Since 
2011, several successful and high profile attacks involving both American and foreign 
born Muslims have occurred. The potentially large number of American Muslims who 
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hold radical opinions but have not moved to radical action bears remembering in light of 
this information (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014). 
One variable that changes the applicability of previous research regarding the 
incidence of lone wolf and homegrown terrorism is the impact that a radicalized version 
of the Muslim faith plays in the creation of homegrown terrorism. Inclusion of this 
variable represents a clear departure from the previous research mentioned here and that 
inclusion affects the outcome of the study (Brooks, 2011). Self-sacrifice is esteemed in 
these groups and these specific types of individuals are not truly isolated or ill equipped. 
Evidence suggests that because of the recruitment and training available through the 
internet and the ability of American Muslims to travel overseas for personal training, the 
radical Islamic homegrown terrorism trend is changing toward a more willing and able 
demographic (Brooks, 2011, p. 30). Furthermore, a plethora of evidence suggests that 
American Muslims would be more capable of plotting attacks without premature 
apprehension than in past years, even if they began to plot attacks in larger numbers 
(Brooks, 2011, p. 37). More recent research into the prevalence of lone wolf terrorism 
indicates that the activity is on the rise throughout the Western world, primarily in the 
United States (Spaaij & Ramon, 2012; Teich, 2013).  
Increased assistance from established terror groups abroad can increase the 
likelihood and success of lone wolf terrors attack in the United States (Brooks, 2011). 
The internet has been utilized as a recruitment tool and a means for communication 
between radicalized individuals since the beginning of its widespread use in the late 
1990s (Teich, 2013, p. 4). Alarmingly, the internet increases the opportunity for lone wolf 
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terrorists because it enables them to receive information and training from a position of 
solitude within their own country, adding to the difficulty in detecting their plots (Teich, 
2013, pp. 4-5). Furthermore, the internet reaches younger, more educated people than 
traditional means of recruitment which leads to more able and willing radicals (Teich, 
2013, p. 5).   
The increased prevalence of social media platforms, blogs, chatrooms, YouTube, 
and even online magazines has been fully embraced by extremists and terrorists as a 
primary tool in recruitment, training, and encouragement (Neumann, 2013, pp. 431-432). 
The internet has contributed to the fact that lone wolf terrorists are the fastest growing 
type of terror (Weimann, 2012). From 1990-2000, the number of terrorist websites grew 
from about a dozen to over 8,000 (Weimann, 2012, p. 76). In modern times, lone wolf 
terrorists are not truly alone, they are part of a larger network of like-minded thinkers 
who recruit, radicalize, teach, and train lone wolf attackers (Weimann, 2012, p. 78-79). 
 These internet based platforms are the most prominent and efficient means for 
created homegrown, lone wolf terrorists (Neumann, 2013). Online forums provide 
propaganda, help radicalize individuals, teach them terrorist tactics such as bomb making, 
and help them plan their attacks (Neumann, 2013; Weimann, 2012). The primary target 
of online radicalization is the younger generation and “Western online communities, such 
as Facebook,” are the main tool utilized (Weimann, 2012, p. 83).  
A deadly example of this tactic emerged in the Fort Hood, Texas, shooting by 
Army Major Nidal Hasan. Hasan had been communicating with Anwar Al Awlaki, who 
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is a U.S. born cleric residing in Yemen (Neumann, 2013, p. 432). He has also inspired a 
dozen plots to commit terror (Neumann, 2013, p. 432).  
Additionally, groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have used 
online videos to spread their ideology. These videos often show scenes of explicit 
violence that have been perpetrated by ISIS. ISIS has also “hijacked” trending hashtags 
from Twitter on multiple occasions in an effort to spread their ideology (Trowbridge, 
2014). Terror groups are also utilizing online methods to initiate cyber-attacks against the 
West (Wiemann, 2012, p. 79). Despite efforts by the United States government, social 
media outlets, and computer savvy individuals to silence and combat ISIS on the internet, 
they remain a viable player in the world of social media and online propaganda 
(Trowbridge, 2014).  
The primary reason that online radicalization has grown in popularity is due to the 
change in focus of organized terror groups such as al Qaeda and ISIS in recruiting new 
members. Their propaganda encourages jihadists living in the West to execute attacks at 
home instead of traveling to countries in the Middle East (Wiemann, 2012). These groups 
discourage travel to terror hotspots so that individuals can avoid detection and because 
armed combat has decreased leadership in these countries (Weimann, 2012).These facts 
highlight the importance of combating online radicalization in the ongoing effort to 
provide homeland security in America (Neumann, 2013).  
Three basic law enforcement strategies exist that can be utilized to counter online 
radicalization. The strategies are: removal of all extremist content from the internet, 
reduce demand through discrediting the extremist’s narratives, and by using the online 
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activity of terrorist groups to gather intelligence, information, and ultimately apprehend 
them (Neumann, 2013, pp. 432-433). However, reducing supply be eliminating extremist 
content from the internet is not only costly and time consuming, in many instances it 
represents a violation of the United States Constitution (Neumann, 2013, p. 433). 
Terrorists utilize the internet in a multitude of ways. Much of the internet presence of 
terrorism involves communication between cells and logistics (Neumann, 2013, p. 433). 
For example, technology such as encryption has made it very difficult to track lone 
wolves or small autonomous cells. As National Security Agency Director Rogers stated, 
“Paris (attacks in December 2015) would not have happened” without encrypted apps 
(Isikoff, 2016). This use is not geared toward online radicalization and has been used by 
terrorists since the dawn of the internet age. 
The manner in which terrorists use the internet to recruit, train, and help plan 
attacks is what has changed over the past 15 years. In the early part of the 21st century, 
online videos became a major part of the terrorist strategy by depicted successful attacks 
and propaganda aimed at motivating terrorists in the fight against the West (Neumann, 
2013, p. 434). Later in the decade, social media platforms and video editing software 
enabled terrorists to reach new demographics, especially among the young and women 
(Neumann, 2013). These tools allowed terrorists to personally interact with potential 
recruits and use the media tools to desensitize potential recruits to violence and to 
instigate a sense of “moral outrage” by depicting alleged acts of violence perpetrated by 
the West’s military (Neumann, 2013, p. 435). One of the most damaging aspects of social 
media platforms is that these groups tend to present a singular voice among their 
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participants, which prevents dissenting views from being heard. A member of these social 
media groups become inundated with the terrorist message and therefore much more 
likely to become radicalized (Neumann, 2013, p. 436). These online forums are like safe 
spaces where individuals can begin to imagine themselves in an idealized fashion where 
they take on positive characteristics that they may not possess (Neumann, 2012, p. 437). 
In this environment and in the internet age, radicalization is much easier for terrorists to 
cultivate while simultaneously making countering this message more difficult for law 
enforcement. Therefore, lone wolf terrorism becomes a more significant threat by 
reaching people in any area of the world without having to travel. 
Reducing the supply of this extremist content is difficult for a multitude of 
reasons. Foremost among these reasons is the constitutionally protected right to free 
speech. Unless the online content met the standard of a legitimate and direct threat to 
cause harm (Neumann, 2013, p. 438). Subsequently, the vast majority of online content 
cannot be restricted, at least by the United States. While other countries such as Russia 
and China have worked to censor online content, no such efforts are allowed in the 
United States.  
Nationwide filtering, a method that would make internet service providers (ISPs) 
fail to content a user to a flagged extremist site, has been discussed in countries such as 
the UK and Australia. However, this filtering method is quite costly and estimated to only 
filter a small percentage of online radical content (Neumann, 2013, p. 439). Therefore, 
even if the United States were willing and able to circumvent the constitutional 
requirements to free speech, the costs would outweigh the benefit (Neumann, 2013).  
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One method that would avoid constitutional issues but still combat the supply of 
extremist sites is a law enforcement directed cyberattack on websites not hosted within 
the United States. The United States certainly possesses the capabilities to execute such 
action, however, the legality of these attacks may be contrary to international laws 
regarding the use of force  and therefore may be illegal (Neumann, 2013, p. 440). 
Additionally, cyberattacks; even if effective in shutting down the site, deprive law 
enforcement of the logistic and strategic information integral to combating terrorism 
(Neumann, 2013, p. 441). 
The idea of reducing demand argues that inundating the internet with opposing 
voices which advocate for pluralism, freedom, and democracy would nullify the impact 
of the extremist message. However, when looking at the reality of the internet, it appears 
that the internet has actually increased the voices of extremists while providing 
opportunities where like-minded people can isolate themselves with only others whom 
they agree (Neumann, 2013, p. 444). Finally, while the younger generations are 
technologically savvy, their ability to critically think and evaluate information which they 
discover online is largely absent (Neumann, 2013, p. 444). Engaging radicals online 
through social media and commenting on their propaganda websites plays a role in 
combating the effectiveness of online radicalization by reducing demand, but this tactic 
does not provide enough of a counter to effectively prevent terror attacks (Neumann, 
2013). It remains that he most vital tactic in combating terrorism, especially lone wolf 
terrorism, is to gain intelligence regarding communications and plans of attack 
(Neumann, 2013). Many lone wolf terrorists have social media profiles or blogs which 
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give clues to their intentions prior to the action. Using the internet to flag these 
individuals located within the United States is a major concern in the fight against lone 
wolf terrorism (Neumann, 2013, p. 451). However, current tactics to do so have not 
proven comprehensively effective and do not offer recourse to potential targets of the 
attacks, military or civilian. 
There has been a small number of research studies into the actual experiences of 
group terror and lone wolf terror attack survivors. Existing research into the survivors of 
terrorism focuses on issues pertaining to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), post-
traumatic growth (PTG), extended fear, support barriers, effects on the spouses of 
survivors, and how various media coverage and/or interactions effect survivors of attacks. 
 The bulk of this research comes from various studies on the 2011 Utoya Island 
Youth Camp attack in Norway. The attack began with a bomb detonating in Oslo, 
Norway and then continued with a mass shooting at the Norwegian Labor Youth camp 38 
km away. The shooter arrived at the camp dressed as a policeman and claimed to be there 
to secure the island. Out of 564 people on the island, 69 were killed and many more were 
injured (Filkukova, Haftad, & Jensen, 2016).  
Social support for trauma victims, both perceived and received, is strongly 
correlated with better health. Additionally, PTSD, the severity of symptoms, and victim 
recovery are directly correlated to social support (Thoreson, Jensen, Wentzel-Larsen, & 
Dyb, 2014). However, not all victims of trauma pursue the social support that is available 
to them. For the victims of the 2011 Utoya attack, there were identifiable social support 
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barriers identified that interfered with victim recovery. How they related to perceived 
social support was not immediately known. 
Two waves of interviews, one at four to five months post attack and the second at 
thirteen to fourteen months post attack, were conducted relating to social support barriers. 
The scale developed for this measurement was based on a qualitative study of survivors 
of the 1994 Estonia Ferry disaster, in which 852 people died (Thoreson, et al., 2014). The 
scale identified five barriers to receiving social support: survivors thought people were 
tired of hearing about the attack, other people had their own problems, and people would 
think they were too “caught up in it”, they would burden their friends, and that they 
would not be understood by others (Thoreson, et al., 2014, p. 188). Participants were 
measured for perceived social support utilizing the Duke-UNC Functional Social Support 
Questionnaire. An additional measurement of negative social support was included. This 
measurement recorded whether or not a survivor felt “let down” by someone they 
expected to help them (Thoreson, et al., 2014). 
For the survivors of the 2011 Utoya attack, social support barriers were strongly 
correlated to incidence of PTSD. In fact, the effect of the existence of social support, 
perceived or actual, was nonexistent once the social support barriers were factored into 
the equation. It appears that social support barriers were a stronger indicator of incidence 
of PTSD than perceived social support (Thoreson, et al., 2014). 
Due to the unusual duration of the attack, which was 1.5 hours, survivors had 
ample time to process the events and the threat(s) to their life as the event unfolded. 
Among several peritraumatic outcomes, extended fear was identified as particularly 
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relevant item for this event in regards to correlations to the development of PTSD at a 
later date. Extended fear is described as an extension of fear from a traumatic event to 
various other stimuli and across extended periods of time (Filkukova, Haftad, & Jensen, 
2016). In this case, the researchers focused on survivors’ extended fear in relation to their 
rescuers, other survivors, vehicles of transport, and fear extending to gathering locations 
such as the hospital.  
Through phenomenological interviews of 296 of the survivors, eight stimuli were 
identified and experienced by the survivors. The interviews recorded the presence or 
absence of fear for each stimulus. The stimuli included peers, boats, policemen, a news 
helicopter, other people on the mainland, transport vehicle, and a survivor gathering place 
(Filkukova, et al., 2016). All of these stimuli were encountered during or immediately 
after the traumatic event. The results revealed that 160 (54.1%) of the survivors 
experienced extended fear while the remaining 136 (45.9%) did not (Filkukova, et al.; 
2016).  
The participants who experienced extended fear showed significantly higher 
levels of PTSD symptoms five months after the attack than those participants who did not 
identify areas of extended fear in their interview. It is possible since the shooter was 
dressed as a policeman, classical conditioning caused some survivors to fear stimuli that 
under normal circumstances would not illicit the emotion. Furthermore, since the attack 
began with a bomb in Oslo 38 km away, it is possible that the participants who 
experienced extended fear at other locations were not sure that the attack was truly over 
(Filkukova, Haftad, & Jensen, 2016). 
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Increased levels of distress can occur when trauma reminders of an event lead the 
victim to re-experiences the traumatic event. Trauma reminders are cues that mirror or 
resemble events experienced during the traumatic event and consequently cause similar 
reactions of the event itself (Glad, Jensen, Hafstad, & Dyb, 2016). Two hundred eighty 
five survivors of the Utoya Island attack were interviewed to identify trauma reminders 
and to evaluate whether experiencing trauma reminders correlated to levels of PTSD.  
Four to five months after the attack, the participants were given a definition of 
trauma reminders and a short list of examples (things you see, hear, or places you go) and 
asked to describe as many as they could. From this interview, seven general types of 
trauma reminders for the Utoya attack were identified. The seven types of trauma 
reminders were: auditory, situational, emotional, visual, bodily reactions, olfactory, and 
tactile (Glad, et al., 2016). 
During the second interview, which was conducted 14-15 months after the attack, 
the participants were shown a list of the trauma reminders. They were then asked how 
often over the last month they had experienced the reminders and if the reminders caused 
them stress. A 5-point scale where (1) indicated never and (5) indicated very often was 
utilized to measure stress levels emanating from the trauma reminder (Glad, et al., 2016). 
Participants were also asked to identify which type of trauma reminder was the worst.  
These reactions were then measured by the University of California at Los 
Angeles (UCLA) PTSD Reaction Index. This index was used to determine the presence 
of PTSD in the participants by rating their symptom responses on a 5 point scale ranging 
56 
 
from 0 (never) to 4 (most of the time). Only scores of 3 or 4 were used for calculation 
possible PTSD diagnosis (Glad, et al., 2016).  
The results showed that one third of the participants experienced at minimum one 
trauma reminder often or very often within the past month. Only 7.4% of participants 
reported having not experienced any trauma reminder (Glad, et al., 2016). Auditory 
reminders were reported to be the most common and were also noted most often as being 
the worst trauma reminder from the given list. Situation reminders, such as crowds, were 
the second most common trauma reminder. When comparing these results to the 
probability of PTSD, a statistically significant correlation between probably PTSD and 
high exposure to trauma reminders was established. It appears that helping survivors of 
terror attacks identify, understand, and then cope with the stress associated with trauma 
reminders is an important part of trauma recovery (Glad, et al., 2016).  
In addition to the development of PTSD, trauma exposure can also lead to 
posttraumatic growth (PTG). PTG is defined as positive changes in self-esteem, their 
confidence, relationships to others, and life philosophy which are products of having 
experienced a traumatic event (Dekel, Hankin, Pratt, Hackler, & Lanman, 2016). PTG 
appears to arise by using coping mechanisms to make sense of the event. Thirty one 
survivors of the 9/11 terror attack (people who were in or near the WTC at the time of the 
attack) participated in a qualitative study to determine the occurrence of PTG in 9/11 
survivors, PTG’s relationship with PTSD within the same population, and whether or not 
gender played a role in PTG or PTSD. These qualitative interviews were open-ended and 
given seven months and eighteen months after the attack. PTSD symptoms were reported 
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by using the PTSD self-report scale developed by the Diagnostic and Statistics Manual 
IV (Dekel, et al., 2016).  
Evaluating the transcribed interviews revealed that 64% of the survivors showed 
indicators of PTG at 7 months and 71% showed indicators at 18 months. Forty-five 
percent of the participants showed PTG indicators at both interviews and only 10% did 
not show signs of PTG at either interval (Dekel, et al., 2016). The PTG indicators 
identified from the narratives included improved relations with others, individual 
strength, spiritual awakening, and a greater appreciation for life (Dekel, et al., 2016). 
When correlating these results to the PTSD symptom status of the participants, 
the research indicated that participants who were classified as having PTSD were less 
likely to experience PTG at both intervals than those in the non-PTSD classification. 
Furthermore, the research revealed that “greater appreciation of one’s life” was 
consistently mentioned for those participants who showed low levels of PTSD symptoms 
but rarely mentioned by participants who showed high levels of PTSD symptoms (Dekel, 
et al., 2016, p. 321). 
Survivors of terror attacks are not the only ones who are effected by the traumatic 
event. Family members of the survivor are also effected by the trauma experienced by 
their loved one. Furthermore, some spouses of survivors can actually develop PTSD as a 
result of the experience. In order to establish a bidirectional association of PTSD among 
survivors and their spouses, researchers selected 108 direct survivors of a terror attack 
from 2001 to 2009. Parameters for participant inclusion in this research included being 
married, having a minimum rating of 10% disability by the National Insurance Institute, 
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no damage to the brain, at least 18 years old at the time of the attack, and between 21-70 
years at the time of the study (Weinberg, 2013). Fifty-two percent of the survivors had 
been exposed to suicide bombers or explosions, a third to shootings or stabbings, and the 
remaining participants were exposed to rockets or mortar attacks (Weinberg, 2013). 
The results indicate that there are several individual factors which can help predict 
the development of PTSD. Survivors’ levels of “self-forgiveness, forgiveness of others, 
situational forgiveness, self-esteem and social support” are indirectly proportional to their 
likelihood of an onset of PTSD. Their spouses’ levels of these same traits are also 
indirectly proportional to the levels of PTSD experienced by the victims (Weinberg, 
2013). Additionally, high levels of these traits in victims lead to lower levels of PTSD in 
their spouses and vice versa. No other correlations to PTSD onset such as time since the 
attack, years married, etc. were found in the data. It appears that the ability of the 
survivor and their spouse to practice forgiveness, their self-esteem, and social supports 
are directly related to PTSD development in both groups (Weinberg, 2013).  
The media also has an impact on the experiences of terror survivors, both when 
interviewed directly after surviving an attack and also when survivors watch media 
coverage of other terror attacks. However, the way the media affects these two groups is 
different.  
The effect of media interviews on surviving victims’ ability to cope with the 
experience has been studied by analyzing how these media interactions were viewed by 
the victims (Thoreson, Jensen, & Dyb, 2014). Previous research has suggested that media 
coverage of attacks had a significant impact on how victims of these attacks cope with 
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their experience (Thoreson, et al., 2014). In the 2011 Oslo and Utoya Island attack, nearly 
all of the victims were approached by members of the media and 268 chose to be 
interviewed. Being contacted and participating in media coverage of the attack was 
viewed more positively than negatively by survivors of the shooting with 63.8% stating 
the experience was both “positive and negative”, 25.8% saying it was “positive or very 
positive”, and 10.5% stating the experience was “negative or very negative” (Thoreson, 
et al., 2014, p. 643). 
In contrast, the survivors of the 1993 bombing at the Murrah Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City were more negatively impacted by the 9/11 attack media coverage than 
other citizens (Pfefferbaum, North, Pfefferbaum, Jeon-Slaughter, & Houston, 2014). Due 
to watching the media coverage, these survivors experienced increased rates of threat to 
their safety and to the safety of their family. One fourth of the survivors reported feeling 
less safe because of the coverage (Pfefferbaum, et al., 2014). Forty percent of these 
people reported increased concern on the safety of their “loved ones” after 9/11 
(Pfefferbaum, et al., 2014, p. 380). Additionally, one fifth of the Oklahoma City bombing 
survivors reported that they stopped watching media coverage of the 9/11 attacks because 
it was “so frightening” (Phefferbaum, et al., 2014, p. 380). This study indicated that 
increased exposure to 9/11 media coverage had an overall negative impact on survivors 
of the Oklahoma City bombing. 
The current body of research offers a detailed account of how terrorists behave, 
think, and feel about their actions. However, the research is inconclusive regarding the 
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specific level of threat America faces from lone wolf terrorism and in the best means to 
combat terrorism in order to protect America from attack.  
Summary 
Most traditional research into terrorism has focused on group terrorism and the 
factors which lead to individuals joining terror groups. These pieces of research primarily 
focus on the observable behaviors of terrorists, there thoughts and motivations regarding 
their actions, and in developing risk assessment tools to identify individuals who would 
potential become terrorists.  
In the early 21st century, terrorism research has shifted its focus into prevention 
and deterrence of terrorism and evaluating risk assessment tools used for other forms of 
violent criminals against known terrorists. These studies have developed a profile of 
terrorists as mostly young males, educated and employed, with low occurrences of mental 
instability. These traits are consistent with female terrorists. While many 
recommendations have been made and implemented in order to increase the government 
response to terror, research has indicated that the ability of law enforcement to prevent 
lone wolf terrorists is quite low. Several theories of how to increase prevention and 
deterrence have been suggested, including increasing the risk factor of committing a 
terrorist attack and by utilizing crowdsourcing methods.  
One possible method of increasing the risk factor for potential terrorists, 
especially for military targets, is to allow military personnel to carry personally owned 
weapons in a concealed manner while on base. This DoD directive was implemented in 
November 2016 in response to attacks on military targets within the United States in an 
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effort to keep military personnel safer. The DoD policy allowing military personnel to 
carry personally owned weapons for security is intended to help mitigate the risk of harm 
to the military members while on base. We don’t know if this policy is effective, how 
victims of the Fort Hood attack will react to it, or whether there are more efficient and 
viable options for increasing a sense of safety by studying the lived experiences of these 
individuals.  
The present study describes the lived experiences of soldiers who lived and 
worked under the former directive and were personally injured in the Fort Hood attack. 
This research helps to fill the gap of knowledge regarding the prior known threat levels of 
lone wolves, the effect of lone wolf attacks on the work and lives of military survivors, 
the victims’ perspective of the 2016 DoD policy, and to create suggestions that will serve 
to improve military personnel’s sense of security while on base.  
To complete this research, a qualitative research method was most appropriate. A 
phenomenological design was used. Interviews with five surviving victims of the 2009 
Fort Hood shooting were conducted with the purpose of creating a rich, detailed 
description of how the attack affected their lived experiences as a soldier and what 








Chapter 3: Research Method 
The purpose of this study was to establish a need for measures to address threats 
to the security of armed forces personnel from lone wolf attacks, to provide a rich, 
detailed description of survivors’ experiences of the attack at Fort Hood. The study was 
also identified their reflections for improving military personnel’s sense of security while 
on base. 
In this chapter, I explain the research design, the qualitative method of 
phenomenology, and the rationale for this particular method. I define the role of the 
researcher, participants, biases and how they were managed, and all relevant ethical 
issues. I also describe the methodology, including the method for selecting and contacting 
participants, the interview design and questions, and data collection and its analysis.  
All issues regarding the trustworthiness of this research were addressed by 
outlining steps to insure credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. 
Finally, I explain the Institution Review Board (IRB) approval process, detailing 
how I avoided ethical issues regarding the safety and anonymity of participants and how 
data were archived.  
Research Design and Rationale 
 The three research questions I answered were: “How aware were the soldiers of 
the lone wolf threat prior to the phenomena?”, “How did the 2009 shooting at Fort Hood 
affect the work and life of soldiers who survive?”, and “What actions can be taken to 
regain or increase their personal sense of safety while at work on a military base?” 
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The central phenomena under study was the experience of surviving a lone wolf 
terrorist attack on a domestic military target. The underlying concept of this research was 
that by understanding the experience of a lone wolf attack on a military base, effective 
and efficient suggestions can be created to improve a sense of security for the military. 
Five survivors of the 2009 Fort Hood shooting participated in this study.  
I used phenomenology as the qualitative research method for this study. The 
foundation of phenomenology seeks to understand the “meaning, structure, and essence 
of the lived experiences” of a certain phenomenon experience by particular individuals 
(Patton, 2002, p. 104). Phenomenological researchers identify and locate individuals who 
have experienced the phenomenon being researched (Rudestam & Newton, 2015). The 
phenomenon explored and chronicled here is the experience of being a survivor of the 
2009 Fort Hood shooting. I used interviews to develop a rich, detailed description that 
will revealed the shared essence of experiencing the phenomenon.  
My goal for this study was to create a sense of experience regarding the 
phenomenon of surviving a lone wolf terror attack, specifically the Fort Hood shooting, 
and then identify suggestions for increasing the survivors’ sense of security while 
working on a military base. To achieve this goal, phenomenological inquiry was the best 
means available. Phenomenological inquiry focuses on discovering how individuals 
perceive, cope with, and develop meaning from their experiences (Patton, 2002). 
Phenomenological inquiry is based on the philosophical assumption that experiences can 
be best understood by describing and interpreting them in a conscious manner (Patton, 
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2002, pp. 105-106). The best way to learn what other people experience in a phenomenon 
is through thorough interviews (Patton, 2002).  
Quantitative methods were insufficient to describe the world as seen by these 
individuals and other qualitative methods failed to meet the unique criteria of describing 
this type of experience due to the specific criteria for participants and the goals of the 
research. 
Role of the Researcher 
In a phenomenological study, the research instrument is the researcher (Maxwell, 
2013). I conducted this study alone and data was collected through an interview created 
and conducted by me. A researcher’s relationship with the participants is an integral part 
of the design of the research, and the manner in which he/she manages those relationships 
has a direct effect on the interview data collected (Maxwell, 2013). Researchers often 
become part of the experience in a phenomenological study and are both influenced by it 
and are influencing it (Maxwell, 2013). This concept is called “reflexivity” (Hammersley 
& Atkinson, 2007, pp. 14-18). Therefore, a relationship must be cultivated that allows a 
researcher to access the information to answer the research questions in an ethical manner 
(Maxwell, 2013). The essential aspect of the relationship is the ability to create positive 
rapport and work with the participants as a partner in the research (Maxwell, 2013; 
Weiss, 1994). I had no personal or professional relationship with any of the participants, 
and this aspect of the research design was critical to its success.   
Potential bias and assumptions on the part of the researcher must be accounted for 
regarding the topic and the participants (Maxwell, 2013). I possess a positive view of the 
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military stemming from a family history of service and the many positive interactions 
with members of the military could lead to potential bias. Personal ideas regarding policy 
recommendations for increasing the sense of security of military personnel on base and to 
possibly counter or prevent lone wolf terror attacks could have led to bias. I managed 
these biases by submitting a written script of open ended interview questions to a review 
committee to ensure the use of neutral language. Secondly, an audio recorded file was 
created for each interview. I uploaded each interview into Nvivo software. I used direct 
participant quotes when reporting the data analysis as necessary. 
In order to address applicable ethical issues, I took the following precautions for 
this study. Interviews were not conducted at the where I work or where the participants 
work. There was no conflict of interest regarding employment as I am not, nor ever have 
been a member of the military and have no professional relationship with any current 
employer of the participants. Furthermore, I did not offer money or any other incentives 
for participation in this study. All documents and files are being stored on a password 
protected computer and audio recordings are being stored on a digital recorder that is 
locked in a filing cabinet at my residence. Each participant agreed to an IRB approved 
adult consent form which ensured the confidential nature of the interviews and 
guaranteed that all files and records will be destroyed after a period of 5 years from 




Participant Selection Logic 
 Choosing participants for research, often referred to as sampling, is an integral 
aspect of the research design (Maxwell, 2013). There are several methods of sampling 
and the appropriate method depends on the nature of the research design. For a 
qualitative research design, purposeful selection is often the best choice (Maxwell, 2013). 
In purposeful selection, a research deliberately selects participants in a phenomenological 
study as the purpose of phenomenology is to describe the experiences of a particular 
phenomenon (Maxwell, 2013). In this study, I sought to describe the experiences of the 
survivors of the 2009 Fort Hood shooting. The results of the study are not generalizable 
to other populations. Therefore, purposeful selection was the most appropriate sampling 
method (Rudestam & Newton, 2015).  
 Thirty one soldiers suffered gunshot wounds and survived their injuries from the 
shooting. Consequently, the sample could only be drawn from these people. Using 
Google Search, the phrase “list of survivors of the 2009 Ft. Hood shooting” retrieved a 
full list of survivors posted by the San Antonio Express News on November 7, 2009. I 
used the full names provided by the San Antonio Express News and the Facebook search 
feature to look for participants by imputing their name with the phrase “Fort Hood” 
afterwards. I searched the names of all 31 through the Facebook social media application. 
My intention for the research was to interview as many of the soldiers as possible. Once I 
located profiles of survivors, I viewed them to further verify that the profile was of the 
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intended participant. If I located a profile that included information that indicated the 
person had been an Army soldier at Fort Hood in 2009, that profile was marked as a 
profile matching a victim. If I did not locate information about Fort Hood, that name was 
excluded from contact due to not being able to verify identity. If I found no search results 
for a name, that name was excluded.  
 I located 21 injured soldiers through Facebook using this method. I sent each 
contact an individual message via Facebook Messenger using a script approved for 
contact by the Walden University IRB. In the recruiting statement, I introduced myself, 
listed the purpose of the research, and detailed how they were located and that all 
survivors were invited to participate. In the recruiting statement I also instructed them to 
read the IRB approved adult informed consent form attached to the message. The 
Facebook contact message is included as Appendix A. 
 I sent each recruiting statement with an attachment of the IRB approved adult 
consent form. In the IRB approved adult consent form, I detailed the nature of the study, 
its purpose, means used to collect the data, sample interview questions, confidentiality of 
identity, and means of storing the collected data. I also informed the participants that the 
interviews would be audio-recorded. I included in the consent form the risks associated 
with participation and information for seeking help if psychological distress occurred 
from their participation. Eight of the 21 individuals replied to the recruitment message. 
Of these eight, seven agreed to participate in an interview at a date to be determined later. 
Each participant gave informed consent by responding to the message with written 
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confirmation of their consent. Prior to data collection, one participant withdrew their 
consent and another participant did not respond to repeated requests to make an 
appointment for their interview. I interviewed five participants. 
 Qualitative sample sizes are significantly smaller than samples for quantitative 
studies because qualitative studies normally require in-depth analysis by the researcher 
for each participant. For effective descriptions of phenomena, great detail and ample 
periods of time must be part of the data collection process. In order to explore phenomena 
effectively, time and detail must be components of the data collection process. Small 
samples, specifically using purposeful selection, allow for better understanding, 
description, and analysis of a phenomena (Patton, 2002). Researchers utilizing qualitative 
methods normally work with small samples of people who are studied in depth (Miles, 
Huberman, & Saldana, 2014, p. 31). The sample size is normally determined by factors 
such as scope of the study and saturation. The narrower the scope, the fewer participants 
required. Some researchers question the concept of saturation as a marker for quality and 
instead focus on depth of data and by selecting quality participants who represent the 
phenomena under research (O’Reilly & Parker, 2012). 
 According to Creswell (2013), phenomenological researchers should aim for five 
to 25 participants to achieve saturation. Morse (2000) suggests at least six participants. 
The five participants in this research represented 16% of the entire population who 




The primary research instrument in qualitative studies is the researcher (Maxwell, 
2013; Rudestam & Newton, 2015). Interviews are a more traditional instrument and are 
used in qualitative research to generate discussion of the object of the research or 
phenomena (Rudestam & Newton, 2015). I conducted this research utilizing an open-
ended interview for describing the phenomenon and answering the research questions. In 
the interview questions, I sought to identify how aware the soldiers were of a lone wolf 
threat prior to the attack, the events of the day in question, emotions and effects of 
surviving, how relationships within the military were effected, and suggestions on 
improving a sense of security for military personnel.  
Each individual interview question corresponded to a specific research question. 
Interview question number one corresponded to research question number one. Interview 
questions two, three, and four corresponded to research question number two. Interview 
questions number five and six corresponded to research question number three. Each 
interview question had multiple parts. The questions themselves used particular language 
to evoke the most salient responses from participants to develop the most detail rich 
description of the experience being researched. Examples of this type of language 
included: “What do you think; what is your opinion; how do you feel, describe the 
events, etc.” (Patton, 2002). The interview questions are included in full as Appendix B. 
Interviewing allows the researcher to gain the perspective of the individuals who 
experienced the phenomena (Patton, 2002). For the interview to be successful, the open-
ended interview must meet the criteria of using carefully chosen, emotionally neutral 
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language (Patton, 2002). The interview questions must be read fully to each participant 
(Patton, 2002). Open-ended questions enabled the participant to answer in their most 
salient way possible because they are not restricted in any way by the question (Patton, 
2002). In the interview, I asked the participants to describe events, emotions, and 
opinions without presupposing any particular answer type. 
I created the interview used in this study. The creation of the instrument as an 
open-ended interview was based upon the research questions and conceptual framework 
for this study. The interview questions were created with the intent to gain understanding 
in order to fully answer the research questions that informed the design of this research 
(Maxwell, 2013). 
I created the instrument using evaluation parameters for open-ended interviews 
outlined by Patton (2002). These parameters included: exact wording and sequence of the 
interview being constructed prior to the interview, all participants were asked all of the 
questions in the same order, and each question had an open-ended nature with follow up 
questions ready (Patton, 2002). Open-ended interviews have a number of strengths that 
make it the best method of interviews for the current research (Patton, 2002). These 
strengths include: availability of instrument by other researchers, minimized variation, 
effective use of time due to the precise focus of questions, and the ability to easily 
compare and analyze answers (Patton, 2002). Answering the same questions creates the 
ability to establish a comprehensive description of the phenomenon under research. Open 
ended questions were the best means for gathering rich, detailed information (O'Sullivan, 
Rassel, & Berner, 2008). Open ended questions avoided potential researcher bias, 
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expanded the possibilities of responses, and allowed for follow up questions to expand on 
understanding the phenomena (O'Sullivan, Rassel, & Berner, 2008, p. 216). 
Validity in phenomenological inquiry is more accurately described as the level of 
trustworthiness for the interview or data (Rudestam & Newton, 2015, p. 131). Validity 
for this interview protocol was established in several ways. Nonverbal cues; such as tone 
of voice, inflection, and cadence are all valuable tools in determining the validity of the 
research (Rudestam & Newton, 2015, p. 131).  These cues can identify emotions or 
messages not explicit in the actual words used by the participants. The participants did 
not have access to Facetime/Skype, I conducted phone interviews. Telephone interviews 
do not allow the researcher to observe body language or eye contact, but research has 
shown that telephone interviews can create rich and vivid accounts of events due to a 
more relaxed environment than face to face contact (Novick, 2008). In other words, 
participants feel freer to express their true thoughts due to not having to see the 
researcher face to face.  
An additional method for establishing validity is to record the interview and 
transcribe the interview in its entirety (Maxwell, 2013). All interviews were audio-
recorded, transcribed by the researcher into a Microsoft Word document, and uploaded 
into Nvivo software.  
After the interview, respondent validation was done by soliciting feedback from 
participants about the data collected and the conclusions regarding the meaning of what 
the participants are saying (Maxwell, 2013). Each interview was conducted one on one 
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by me only. Doing so avoided interviewer bias and prevented participants from being 
influenced by the responses of other participants. 
Procedures for Participation and Data Collection 
The data was collected at a date and time agreed upon by the participant and 
researcher. Due to geographic and financial limitations, all interviews were conducted via 
cell phone. I instructed each participant to allow for a sixty minute interview with a five 
minute debriefing period. They were instructed to be interviewed in a quiet, private 
location where they could give their full attention to the interview. I conducted the 
interview from an isolated, private room in my residence that was quiet and free from 
distraction.  
In the interview, I sufficiently addressed the information needed to fully answer 
all three of the research questions. I created a digital audio recording on my own digital 
recording device and created a written transcript of each interview. The recording device 
used included USB capabilities in order to upload the audio files into Nvivo. By 
recording the interviews I ensured that focusing on field notes was not a distraction and 
that each participant had their interview recorded correctly. Doing so provided the data 
collected with a high level of fidelity (Rudestam & Newton, 2015) 
The data was collected by a single interview conducted on a one a one basis. Each 
participant was interviewed individually. Data collection took place over the course of 
several days due to researcher/participant schedules. Each interview was scheduled far 
enough apart as to not rush any of the interviews. No interview exceeded the sixty minute 
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time limit provided by the researcher. No pressure was applied to continue the interview 
past 60 minutes. 
During the debriefing period, each participant was asked if they would like to add 
anything to their interview. The participants were also asked if they had any questions 
about the interview, the next steps in the research process, or any other concerns that they 
had. They were reminded of the confidentiality of the data collected and of the Veteran’s 
Assistance Program via the National Suicide Prevention hotline that was included in the 
Adult Consent Form.  
Data Analysis Plan 
The data collected stemmed from open-ended interview questions that addressed 
the awareness of lone wolf threats but mainly sought to describe the actual experiences of 
surviving the 2009 Fort Hood attack. In other interview questions I asked about possible 
recommendations that could lead to a greater sense of security for military personnel 
while on base. I created all of the questions to thoroughly answer the research questions. 
Analyzing data concurrently to the data collection is an important aspect of 
qualitative research (Miles, et al., 2014, p. 70). Concurrent analysis of data allows the 
researcher to think critically about the interviews which can lead to a better means of 
collecting data in the future and can help eliminate blind spots (Miles, et al., 2014, p. 70). 
In this study, I utilized the following sequence for analyzing the data. I developed 
a list of recurring and/or similar statements from the transcribed interviews. These 
statements focused on the description of their awareness level of the lone wolf threat, 
how the soldiers experienced the event, and their suggestions for increasing security 
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(Creswell, 2013). Each statement was given equal value and was non-repetitive 
(Creswell, 2013). I grouped these statements into chunks of data based upon common 
themes, called codes. Then I began describing what was experienced by each soldier and 
how each soldier experienced the event. 
Prior to coding data, I made several key considerations. I needed to be clear as to 
what the literature stated about the topic, address the role of bias in observations and 
interview techniques, focus on the research questions, determine the depth of the coding I 
embarked upon, determine the type of analytic framework to be utilized, and the unit of 
analysis (Zickmund, n.d.). 
There are two categories of coding, deductive and inductive. Deductive coding 
can be described as a preliminary list of possible codes created by the researcher prior to 
any data being collected (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014). Inductive coding emerges 
during the actual collecting of data. This category of data are more empirically grounded 
(Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014). In order to avoid researcher bias or preconceived 
outcomes, inductive coding was used for this research. 
Coding is an effective and widely accepted means of analyzing interview data 
which involves applying symbolic meaning to data (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014). 
There are several types of first cycle coding that can be used in qualitative research. For 
this research, first cycle coding was used to separate information into data chunks by 
which research question the statement answers. Three specific types of first cycle coding 
were used. In vivo coding separates data into clusters based upon specific words or 
phrases used by interview participants which allows for easier retrieval during the 
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analysis process. This method of coding can be referred to as thematic coding; utilizing 
reoccurring themes from multiple interviews. Emotional coding categorizes clusters into 
code words which describe emotions felt by the participants. These emotions included 
depression, fear, trauma, insecurity, and anxiety. The final type of coding used was value 
coding. Value codes helped categorize viewpoints on the political issues inherent within 
the military field, its security protocols, and helped to identify how the culture of the 
military informs the experiencing of the phenomena (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 
2014).  
 Second cycle coding identifies patterns by analyzing the first cycle coding 
results. Nvivo software was used to identify first cycle codes and for their analysis in the 
development of second cycle coding. Second cycle coding allowed for managing a large 
amount of data in a manner that facilitated focus and a cognitive map of the phenomenon 
(Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014, p. 86). These pattern codes ultimately led to more in 
depth analysis of the interview results. Pattern codes most often summarize data in four 
interrelated ways: Categories/themes, causes/explanations, relationships among people, 
and theoretical constructs (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014). 
 I uploaded data, in the form of interview recordings, into Nvivo for coding and 
analysis. I used the audio file and written transcripts in Nvivo for data analysis. Once 
uploaded, I used Nvivo to search all of the data and determined codes based upon 
methods including word frequency, keyword search identification, and text query (Welsh, 
2002). These results helped to identify codes/themes and grouped them together for 
comparison and analysis. Through Nvivo, I also generated visual displays of the 
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relationships between multiple themes from each interview. Examples included word 
maps, a tree cloud, and cluster analysis. By using Nvivo I was supplied with a well-
structured data management tool which organized interview data, nodes for study, and 
results analysis. 
 According to Patton (2002), “no formula exists” to turn data into results (p. 432). 
However, there are methods that can guide the researcher into successfully transforming 
data into clear findings. Analytic frameworks focus on “processes, issues, questions, and 
sensitizing concepts” (Patton, 2002, p. 439). In order to accomplish successful analysis, I 
coded the data into “themes and processes” (Creswell, 2013, p. 180). I conducted this 
process by running a text search on the transcripts within Nvivo to identify broad 
categories based upon actual words used by the participants. While there is no concrete 
rule on what data a qualitative researcher must code, guidelines for coding include 
identifying common topics, ideas, and terms (Gibbs & Taylor, 2005) by converging 
similarities between interviews into an overall picture of what the data is saying (Patton, 
2002, p. 465). These general themes and topics were separated into nodes that helped 
analyze connections between various data points from the interviews. 
 Once I coded and analyzed the data, I began writing descriptions of what each 
individual experienced during the attack and how the attack effected them going forward; 
utilizing word for word examples from the recorded interviews. This description is called 
textural description (Creswell, 2013). Then I wrote a description of how the event 
happened, detailing the setting and context, for each soldier. This description is called the 
structural description (Creswell, 2013).  
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 In the last step, I combined the textural and structural descriptions into a cohesive 
description that represented the defining essence exemplifying the experiences of 
surviving the 2009 Fort Hood attack. 
Issues of Trustworthiness 
Credibility 
As previously mentioned, member checks and reflexivity were utilized in the 
research to establish internal validity. Member checks can be performed during the 
interview to clarify the meaning of interview question answers. Validity in qualitative 
studies refers to your conclusions being based in the reality of the experience (Maxwell, 
2013). Member checks provided evidence of validity by providing the researcher with 
clarification and affirmation of the researcher’s interpretation of the interviewee’s 
responses (Maxwell, 2013). These member checks helped to establish a better 
understanding of their reality. 
Reflexivity can be a detrimental influence on the research if not managed 
appropriately. Avoiding influence of the researcher is not possible, so preventing 
negative influence is the goal (Maxwell, 2013). The interview questions used neutral 
language and used non-leading questions to avoid leading participants into a 
predetermined answer.  
Transferability 
Phenomenological research is not normally transferable to other population due to 
the unique nature of the phenomenon being researched. This research is even more 
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narrowly constructed because the total population of people who experienced the 
phenomenon is 31.  
In this study, I help better understand how others experience lone wolf attacks, 
but due to variations in population such as military or civilian status, method of lone wolf 
attack, and location; the findings are not able to be directly transferrable to other 
populations.  
Dependability 
Specific interview questions were intentionally developed that enabled a rich, 
detailed description of the phenomenon’s experiences and the setting in which it 
occurred. Utilizing audio recordings, transcripts, and Nvivo coding of transcripts 
increased the dependability of the research. Furthermore, doing these tasks will allow 
other researchers to replicate the study within the same population or in an attempt to 
generalize the findings to another similar comparison group. 
I created an audit trail of the research. The audit trail includes the raw data (audio 
recordings and Nvivo coding) and a description of how the data was analyzed and 
synthesized. I analyzed and transcribed my thoughts, ideas, and reactions. 
Confirmability 
Confirmability of the research could be compromised by research bias or 
significant influence. To reduce or eliminate this risk, I used interviews with neutral 
language questions that asked for the participant to describe their thoughts and feelings. 
The researcher only asked probing or clarifying questions from the participant responses. 
I audio recorded the interviews and uploaded them into Nvivo for subsequent analysis. 
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Doing so minimized the threat of making conclusions based upon preconceptions or goals 
(Maxwell, 2013). The reflexivity principle states that the researcher will become part of 
the world they study so minimizing the negative aspect of reflexivity entailed the use of 
non-leading, emotionally neutral, open-ended questions (Maxwell, 2013). 
Ethical Procedures 
I contacted the IRB for permission to locate and recruit participants before the 
approval of the proposal. Due to the small population size and the delicate nature of the 
study, I wanted to ensure that a sufficient number of participants would agree to the study 
before completing the proposal and gaining the subsequent permissions to collect data. 
After submitting all of the necessary paperwork, the IRB approved permission to contact 
applicants for this research. The approval number was 11-11-16-00422053. I contacted 
23 surviving victims of the Fort Hood Attack via the Facebook public search engine. 
Using Facebook, I sent an IRB approved message that detailed what the research entailed 
and formally asked them to participate. I attached to each Facebook message the IRB 
approved adult consent Form. Eight surviving members replied to the message. Seven 
consented to participate and one declined. I thanked each willing participant and 
informed them that their interview would take place at a later date once approval of the 
research proposal had been obtained. 
The risk of psychological stress associated with participating in this research is 
significant. In the adult consent form, I advised each participant of this potential risk and 
provided a toll free hotline for veteran counseling. I encouraged participants to contact 
this hotline if necessary after the completion of their interview. 
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Upon completion of the proposal process, I submitted an updated IRB application 
for consent to collect data. The IRB approval number for data collection was 08-25-17-
0422053. Due to the DoD policy change in November of 2016, there were slight 
modifications to interview questions and the research purpose on the adult consent form 
for data collection. From the original seven participants who agreed to participate, five 
were interviewed. 
During data collection, I reminded participants before the interview began that 
participation was voluntary and may be discontinued by the participant at any time during 
the interview. If the participant decided to withdraw prior to completion of the interview 
for any reason, I would have reminded them of the hotline provided to them in the adult 
consent form. However, no participant withdrew their consent during the interview 
process. Furthermore, I reminded each participant of this hotline at the end of the 
completed interview. There was also a short debriefing session at the end of each 
interview. In this debriefing session, I included an opportunity for the participant to ask 
any questions that they may have or provide any comments about the interview and/or 
research. Only Participant 4 asked a question during debriefing. The participant asked for 
clarification as to what was the ultimate goal of the research. I informed Participant 4 that 
the ultimate goal was to provide information through survivors’ experiences in order to 
improve security for members of the military. 
All data collected from the interviews will remain confidential. When reporting 
the data, I assigned each participant an alphanumeric code that identified them only to 
myself. I stored all data on my personally owned laptop during the research study. When 
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I completed the research, I downloaded all data onto a personally owned thumb drive that 
is being stored in a locked filing cabinet at my residence. I then deleted all data from the 
laptop. I stored all handwritten notes with the thumb drive in the locked drawer. After 
five calendar years have passed from the completion of the research, I will destroy all 
data per Walden University and IRB guidelines. 
Summary 
The research questions sought to describe the lone wolf threat awareness of the 
soldiers, the experiences of the survivors of the 2009 Fort Hood attack, and to obtain their 
recommendation for improving military personnel’s sense of security while on base. 
Answering these questions required a qualitative design using a phenomenological 
method.  
I was the only researcher for this study and collected data through individual 
interviews. I personally developed the interview guide which was focused on answering 
the research questions. 
I selected the participants by using a public list of the surviving victims of the 
Fort Hood attack. I located the victims via their Facebook social media page and 
contacted with IRB approved documents. Five total victims chose to participate. 
My interviews were the primary means of data collection. The interview protocol 
utilized open-ended questions geared towards describing experiences with neutral 
wording of the questions. I used the community based approach to health and safety as 
the conceptual framework for the development of these questions. 
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I used Nvivo 11 software to develop first cycle codes and analysis for these codes 
to create second cycle codes. I also stored digital audio files in Nvivo.  
I took several measures to ensure credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability. These measures included the use of non-leading questions to minimize 
negative effects of reflexivity, member checks, audit trails, and audio recordings of the 
entire interview. When attempting to convey important and salient points, direct quotes 
from the interviewees were used.  
I took several measures to avoid ethical issues. I completed the National Institutes 
of Health “Protecting Human Research Participants” web based training. The IRB 
approved documents included warnings of possible negative effects of participation, free 
resources for counseling if needed, and explicit language describing the voluntary and 
confidential nature of their participation in this research. 
In the following chapter, I discussed the research setting and demographics of the 
participants. Furthermore, I presented actual data collection methods, the analysis of the 










Chapter 4: Results  
The purpose of this study was to establish the need to address internal and 
external threats to the security of armed forces personnel from lone wolf attacks, to 
provide a rich, detailed description of survivors’ experiences of the 2009 attack at Fort 
Hood, and to identify their reflections on improving military personnel’s sense of security 
while on base. The central question of this research was: How were the victims of the 
Fort Hood attack affected by this experience in their work and life?  
There were three research questions that were answered. 
RQ 1: How aware were the soldiers of the lone wolf threat to military installation 
prior to the attack? 
RQ 2: How did the 2009 attack at Fort Hood affect the work and life of soldiers 
who survived the attack?  
RQ 3: What actions can be taken to regain or increase their personal sense of 
safety while on base? 
In this chapter I review the research setting, demographics of the participants, the 
data collection process and analysis. I then address the various categories of evidence for 
trustworthiness to include any modifications from the original proposal. Finally, I present 
the results of the study.  
Research Setting 
I conducted the interviews via cell phone from an empty room in my residence. 
Both the participants and I were in private to ensure confidentiality of the interview. I 
asked each participant all of the questions located in Appendix B. I asked follow up 
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questions for elaboration or insuring clarity based upon participant answers. I audio 
recorded each interview. There were no organizational conditions or outside factors, such 
as trauma unrelated to the 2009 attack at Fort Hood, which affected participants during 
the time frame of the study that would influence interpretation of the study results. 
Demographics 
The participants were Army soldiers who were being processed for deployment at 
the Fort Hood Soldier Readiness Processing facility. The participants were being 
deployed to the Middle East as part of the ongoing War on Terror.  
Three men and two women participated in the research. At least one officer and at 
least one enlisted soldier participated in the study. Due to the small population size and 
the identities of the victims being accessible to the public, no further demographic 
information or characteristics of participants such as age, rank, military occupation 
specialty (MOS), or time served in the Army will be revealed. The location and extent of 
the injuries suffered from each soldier is also public knowledge, so no specific descriptor 
will be given for the injuries sustained by the participants. This decision was made to 
insure the confidentiality of all participants in accordance with the adult consent form.  
Data Collection 
I interviewed five participants for this study. I conducted each interview in an 
empty room of my residence via cell phone.  I interviewed each participant one time in a 
single session and they answered all of the questions in order as presented in Appendix B. 
I audio-recorded all interviews on a digital recording device owned by me. My cell phone 
was put in speaker mode in order for the recording device to detect participant responses. 
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To ensure confidentiality, I was the only person in the residence at the time of the 
interviews. Four interviews lasted approximately 30 minutes. One interview lasted 58 
minutes. At the conclusion of each interview, I conducted a short debriefing period where 
the participants could add any information that they wanted to convey to the reader of 
this study or ask any questions of me. 
There were no variations in the data collection plan presented in Chapter 3. There 
were no unusual or unexpected circumstances encountered during data collection. 
Data Analysis 
After conducting each interview, I replayed the audio recording and transcribed 
each answer from the interview questions. In order to ensure that accurate quotes were 
transcribed, I paused and replayed several key moments of each interview. For the 
transcription, I utilized Microsoft Word and while listening to each interview via MP3 
files created on the researcher’s laptop. I labeled the transcripts in numerical order 
respective of the corresponding interview questions. I created the transcripts to follow the 
interview chronologically. During the course of the interviews and their transcription, I 
conducted preliminary data analysis. I took short field notes to categorize basic patterns 
emerging from these interviews, such as similar answers to research questions. Once I 
completed these transcript documents, I uploaded them into Nvivo 11. This is where the 
coding process began in earnest. After reading through the transcripts, I developed six 
first cycle nodes based upon the purpose of each grouping of interview questions. The 
first cycle nodes created were: safety, experiences, effects, feelings, policy opinions, and 
suggestions. I developed these nodes by identifying the purpose that each set of interview 
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questions sought to answer. I categorized all data from each participant relevant to each 
of the nodes. Using Nvivo 11, I compiled the data chunks from each transcript into the 
corresponding nodes. This allowed me to view all participant answers side by side for 
each set of interview questions. Once I categorized these data chunks into nodes, I 
reviewed each data chunk from each participant individually in order to develop more 
specific themes and categories.  
Second cycle coding involved rereading each data chunk found in the first cycle 
nodes. The data chunks were arranged according to the order in which they appeared in 
the interview transcript, which allowed for comparison and analysis across participants in 
multiple areas of inquiry. From this process, several patterns began to emerge from the 
data that led to additional nodes utilizing emotion and/or value coding.  
I developed these codes by analyzing each participant’s answers to the interview 
questions and identifying similar patterns of emotions and feelings. Some of these were a 
sense such as fear of public places, and others much more specific, such as disbelief that 
the attack was actually happening. I highlighted key phrases and passages in the data for 
each of the first cycle nodes and hand recorded these phrases on notebook paper. Then I 
reviewed these notes seeking to identify what the common patterns were in order to 
create second cycle codes. I also ran a word frequency query with Nvivo in order to 
identify patterns that may have been missed. I checked the salient words that appeared 
most often against the transcription and my field notes to determine additional codes. 
Once I identified and named them appropriately, I created the nodes in Nvivo and moved 
the corresponding data chunks into these new nodes for further review. The second cycle 
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codes that I identified were: beliefs, attitudes, emotions, disbelief, and life changes. I 
grouped participant views of the role of the military in preventing the attack and in the 
military’s actions taken in the aftermath of the attack, including the DoD policy change 
and suggestions for increasing security, into the beliefs and attitudes nodes. Some 
examples of raw data used to create the nodes of beliefs include these from Participant 1: 
“I do not think there is a way to prevent lone wolf attacks,” and “I have no idea if soldiers 
carrying guns would have made a difference if the policy were in effect in 2009,” and 
that “many people were devastated that a psychiatrist, a senior officer was responsible.”  
Another participant stated, “Everyone was too scared and was politically correct (to 
report Hasan after his presentation). Didn’t want to offend anyone.” One participant said, 
“They (military) should have given more counseling help, and training. Nobody was 
there to give me training and assist me to get back to base. Had no coping training.” All 
but Participant 4 conveyed a specific belief about the military’s role in prevention or in 
their response to the aftermath of the attack. 
The node of attitudes related to the changed manner in which several participants 
described their awareness level after the attack and changing attitudes toward Muslims. 
Three participants described specific attitudes that they now hold regarding personal 
awareness and safety. One participant stated,  
“I watch what I’m doing. Never go around a large crowd. I’m cautious of 
 everybody. I finally went to a football game just last year. I check the security of 




Two participants specifically mentioned changed attitudes towards Muslims. One 
stated that they are “wary of Middle Eastern people” while the other participant stated 
that they “aren’t too fond of Muslims” since the attack. 
Three participants described their level of fear during the attack. One participant 
stated that they were not “scared or nervous at all” and were just following their training. 
However, this participant never realized the attack wasn’t a training exercise.  
Two participants stated that they were “scared to death” and “fearful” they were 
going to die. Another participant described several people they encountered during the 
attack as being “very scared” and in shock. 
Another pattern that emerged was the sense of disbelief that this attack was 
actually happening. Four participants indicated that, at first, they believed the attack was 
a training exercise. One of these participants never realized during the attack that it was 
real. This participant only discovered the reality of the attack when they awoke in a 
hospital ICU. Examples of disbelief from the other three participants include: “(I was) 
panicked, hysterical and couldn’t believe what was going on. Nothing like this had ever 
happened to me in my life,” and that they were “devastated that a psychiatrist, a senior 
officer” was the person responsible for the attack. 
There were universal patterns of life changes that appeared in the participants. All 
participants indicated some level of paranoia, anxiety, or fear after the attack. Much of 
these changes were still felt to this day in 2017. Participant 4 indicated high levels of 
depression and drinking. Participant 5 stated “I’ll never be the same.”  
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I coded many salient quotes that aided in developing a thorough understanding of 
the experience of surviving the attack in Nvivo. These quotes also contributed to 
identifying themes in the data. These In Vivo quotes included but are not limited to: 
“Affected my life in every possible way every single day. A lot of depression, a lot of 
drinking,” “wary of Middle Eastern people. I don’t think I’ll ever be the same,” “I get 
more anxious and more angry,” and “people need to wake up about it (Muslim 
terrorism).”  I identified these In Vivo codes when transcribing the interviews. These 
quotes stood out during transcription due to their authenticity of feeling and significance 
to the research purpose. 
I developed several themes of the experience utilizing these additional nodes. 
Each participant felt universal safety while on base. All five participants described their 
view of safety in very similar terms, each indicating that safety was never a concern prior 
to the attack. Three participants indicated that after the attack, they felt fearful of their 
safety. None of the participants had ever met Hasan.  
Four of the participants stated that they thought the attack was training at first. 
One stated that they didn’t realize it wasn’t training until they woke up in the hospital. 
The other three realized it was real when they saw blood or were injured by gunfire.  
Each participant described how the attack has affected their life afterward. 
Hyperawareness of surroundings was the most identified effect. One stated that they can’t 
“eat normal at a restaurant.” Four of the five participants described very significant 
changes in their lives and/or attitudes since the attack.  
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Four participants believed the military should have done more to prevent the 
attack and should have taken better care of the survivors in the aftermath. Additionally, 
three of the participants agreed that the 2016 DoD policy change will be a positive move 
toward preventing attacks and keepings soldiers safe.  
From these last two aspects of the research, I identified a discrepancy in the 
beliefs and attitudes toward the military’s role in the event and in the policy change itself. 
Regarding the discrepancies, I probed further to identify and understand the differences 
in the participants which may have caused the discrepancy.  
One of the main reasons for the discrepancy in the case of life changes is the fact 
that the discrepant case never realized the attack was real. The participant called this a 
“protective factor” and identified other protective factors related to coping with this 
experience. The other protective factors include: “never seeing blood,” having experience 
hearing stories of combat trauma, and the discrepant case described the support they 
received from the military in the aftermath as a “fantastic job.” This same discrepant case 
also believed that it was “impossible” to stop these types of attacks and that there isn’t 
much more the military could do to make people more secure. “Having a major who was 
a psychiatrist who was the shooter proves you can’t predict” these attacks.  
I viewed the data chunks through two lenses, one to identify the structural 
description of the attack itself and the other to develop a textural description of the 
emotional, social, and physical effects of surviving the attack. These two types of 
descriptions combined to cohesively describe the phenomenon of surviving the 2009 




The results of the interviews allowed for greater understanding of this 
phenomenon and answered the three research questions at the core of this study. The 
soldiers were not aware of any threat, lone wolf or otherwise, to American military bases 
prior to the attack at Fort Hood. The soldiers who survived this attack had their lives 
change in dramatic ways, some more so than others. Increased levels of awareness, 
anxiety, and paranoia were common themes expressed. Participants described varying 
levels of stress associated with the attack and some have permanent physical 
impairments. Many effects of the attack alter the manner in which the participants work 
and live. My data analysis identified six themes from the interviews. The themes I 
developed were that there was no awareness of a threat to safety prior to the attack; 
disbelief that the attack was real; hyper-awareness, anxiety, and depression as effects of 
surviving; shared connections with victims of other lone wolf attacks; majority support of 
the 2016 DoD policy change; and a need for better training, show of force throughout 
bases, and an anonymous ability to report suspected threats. 
All but one participant thinks the military can do better to prevent attacks and also 
can do more to assist soldiers who survive these types of attacks. Suggestions included 
more armed military police, more mental health checks, and a designated office to 
anonymously report suspected internal threats.  
Safety and Threat Awareness 
The participants felt the perception of safety while on base prior to the attack was 
universally positive. The participants described their view of safety as 
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“comfortable…never thinking about it one way or another”, “felt very safe on base”, 
“never gave it (safety) a second thought”, “thought Fort Hood was “very safe”, to one 
participant stating that the base was the “safest place on earth.” None of the participants 
indicated that they were aware of any specific threats to military bases either from outside 
actors or from anyone inside the military. One participant stated that they had just been 
through thirty days of training regarding “various types of threats.” However, none of 
these threats were specific in nature to lone wolf attacks in the United States. This 
participant indicated that there was training “overload” and “doesn’t remember a lot of 
specifics.” None of the participants had ever met Nidal Hasan. 
Structural Description of Experiencing the Attack 
The structural description of the attack identified several common elements. All 
participants were being processed for deployment to either Iraq or Afghanistan. The room 
where the attack happened was a large room with many partitions and cubicles. 
Participant 1 stated there were “about seventy people on the other side of the partition” 
from their location with several more seated next to them in the hallway. Two other 
participants described seeing Hasan sitting off in a corner by himself and one stated 
thinking it was “really weird” (to see an officer sitting alone in that section) and another 
stated noticing Hasan off by himself but rationed that he is an officer so he “must be 
okay.” All five participants heard a man yell, “Allah Akbar” and then heard shooting. 
Three of the participants stated that at this time they thought the attack was a training 
exercise. After seeing a hole in the partition nearby, one participant thought that it “was a 
93 
 
crappy time to do this type of training.” Some participants saw Hasan shooting and 
remembered “flashes from the gun” and seeing “bullets flying like in a movie.”  
During the course of the attack, Participant 1 never realized that the attack was 
not a training exercise. This participant stated that they went through the motions of their 
training as they were supposed to. They weren’t “scared or nervous” at all. Next to this 
participant, a pregnant woman had been shot in the stomach. The participant noted that 
they thought “it was crappy to shoot her in the stomach.” As the participant began to help 
the woman, the participant noticed that they had been shot from what they thought were 
plastic bullets. Another bullet struck the participant at this time and then a commander 
helped the participant to the door where others helped get them outside. Once outside, the 
participant stated that they told the paramedics, “I’ll think I’ll go into shock now,” and 
remembers thinking that the paramedics should be able to get the IV in quickly since they 
“just had this training.” The participant “didn’t realize the attack was real until waking up 
in the ICU”. The participant noted that the pregnant woman shot in the stomach did not 
survive and that at no point did they remember ever seeing any blood. 
Participant 2, who noted that it was “really weird” seeing Hasan in the back 
corner of the room, sat down and began reading a book. That is when they heard Hasan 
yell “Allah Akbar” and begin shooting. This participant was shot almost immediately 
after the shooting began. Initially, the participant got down on the ground but thought the 
shooting was a training exercise. When they saw blood coming from their wound, they 
realized the attack was real. The participant told people nearby that the attack was real 
and began crawling. The participant looked back and saw Hasan shooting people on the 
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ground. Realizing it was a matter of time before Hasan got to them, participant two 
stopped to think. Thinking for a moment about running, the participant then thought of 
texting friends and family and saying, “I love you.” Not having a “text all option,” the 
participant called 911 instead. When the participant saw a man charge Hasan with a chair, 
the participant ran to the right and hid behind some cubicles until the end of the attack.  
Participant 3 also noted Hasan sitting by himself. Despite realizing that they had 
never seen anyone sitting in that area, the participant didn’t “think anything of it because 
he (Hasan) had a uniform on.” Once the shooting began, this participant also believed the 
attack was a training exercise. The first time the participant was struck by a bullet, they 
believed it to be a very painful paintball. The shot knocked the participant to the floor 
where they noticed “deep red blood” and realized the attack was real. At that time the 
participant went “into straight survival mode.” The participant began to play dead on the 
floor but then saw Hasan coming around shooting people on the floor to “make sure we 
was dead.” Another bullet hit the participant while they were on the floor. The participant 
made the decision to get up and out of the building when they had the chance. When 
Hasan went to another part of the room, the participant got up and began running to the 
door that they had come in, as that was the only exit that the participant was aware of. As 
they were nearing the door, Hasan appeared again and the participant said, “Oh, shit!” 
and was shot again. The participant fell and could not feel anything below their waist. 
Using their arms, the participant crawled behind a partition where another soldier was 
crying. The participant stated, “we need to get out of this building or we’re gonna die!” 
The participant then heard bullets “going off like a canon.” Participant 3 was “panicked, 
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hysterical and couldn’t believe what was going on. Nothing like this had ever happened 
to me in my life.” Feeling slowly returned to the participant’s lower extremities, so the 
participant made a move toward the door where three other soldiers helped the participant 
to safety. 
Participant 4 arrived on base like it was a normal day. This participant noticed 
that there was no MP presence around the area. Upon entering the Soldier Readiness 
Processing (SRP) area, they sat and waited for their turn. Moments later, this participant 
saw a man stand up from the corner of their eye and saw Hasan throw his head back 
while yelling “Allah Akbar” and stated it “looked like a wolf howling.” The shooting 
began and this participant was severely wounded. Upon returning to base after 
rehabilitation, the participant noted that “no additional safety measures were taken” after 
the attack. 
Participant 5 arrived at the SRP site about ten minutes prior to the attack. The 
participant noted that they were at north Fort Hood, which was a training area “for many 
different types of training.” When in the building and waiting for their turn, they heard a 
man shout “Allah Akbar” and then looked over a saw flashes coming from the muzzle of 
a gun. The participant thought that this was a training exercise and dove to the ground as 
the training required. The participant was then shot twice. When assessing the damage, 
the participant realized that the attack was real. The participant crawled behind a partition 
and slid a door open to a nearby cubicle. Inside the cubicle were two females described as 
being “scared to death.” After the participant closed the door the three stayed in the 
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cubicle, able to hear the shooting. The participant stated that the shooting “felt like it 
went on forever.” After several surgeries, this participant did return to Fort Hood. 
Effects and Changes for Survivors 
Surviving the attack at Fort Hood left a lasting effect on each of the five 
participants. There were similar patterns consistent through all five soldiers, but 
participant one represents a unique, discrepant case in regards to how this experience 
effected daily life and work after the attack. Participant 1 describes returning to duty 
without changing their view of personal safety. “Safety is a perception.” This participant 
“chose not to live in fear.” Describes their life as “pretty normal” with “no changes in 
working relationships or view of safety.” However, participant one did acknowledge 
having higher levels of anxiety than before. Additionally, the participant noted that they 
get “more angry.” They described the biggest effect as being an increased level of anxiety 
which causes them to be “a bit more jumpy.” Panic attacks occurred the first few years 
after the attack if they left the house while not wearing the hero bracelet commemorating 
the attack. Participant 1 described having a panic attack when their grandson threw a shoe 
at the window. It took twenty-five minutes to calm down. Physically, there is daily pain 
that never fully goes away. Walking and mobility are impaired for this participant. 
Participant one realizes these emotional changes are due to the attack at Fort Hood, but 
states they don’t think about Fort Hood. Today, not wearing the hero bracelet causes 
some anxiety, but the participant stated that these issues are much more manageable now.  
This participant noted several “protective factors” which they believe allowed for 
a better recovery and lessening the attack’s effect on their daily life. These protective 
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factors include their experience listening to stories of combat related trauma and helping 
them recover, never seeing blood during the attack, and never realizing that the attack 
was real until awakening in the ICU.  
The other four participants described very similar effects from the attack at Fort 
Hood. The main change in their daily life and work is the awareness level of their 
surroundings. Participant 2 described being “hypervigilant” and on guard in their 
environment. For the first couple of years they described “not wanting to be alone, 
especially at night.” This participant did not return to work after the attack and became 
“very weary of Middle Eastern people.” This participant stated, “I don’t think I’ll ever be 
the same.” When asked for examples, participant two described always having to sit 
facing the door at restaurants, finding and planning exit routes when entering a new 
place, and thinking about what to do if another active shooter situation arose. 
Participant 3 described similar changes in awareness. This participant stated that 
they watch what they are doing and try to “never go around a large crowd.” Furthermore, 
they are cautious of everybody and only went to their first football game since the attack 
this past year. Before entering a building, they check the security of the building and do 
not enter if they don’t feel safe. Upon returning to their reserve unit, participant three 
noted not trusting new members of the unit, especially those with guns, even if they were 
police officers who were reservists. Participant 3 noted he didn’t feel comfortable with 
them bringing their weapons to the reserve unit and voiced the concern to the unit 
commander. Participant 3 became so weary of weapons that when required to requalify 
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with a firearm, they required all other individuals to leave the firing range because they 
didn’t trust anyone else. 
Participant 4 became more “aware and questioning, paranoid.” Although their 
view of the military didn’t change, the attack changed their life in many ways. Participant 
4 stated that the attack “effected my life in every possible way every single day.” 
Participant four gave such as examples as being handicapped, suffering from “a lot of 
depression, a lot of drinking.” This participant described their life as having “a lot of 
negativity that shouldn’t be there.” 
Participant 5 stated, “I have not been the same since the shooting” and is “always 
on constant high alert.” Loud noises startle and alert the participant and they “can’t eat 
normal at a restaurant.” Describes being very aware of surroundings and weary of being 
around people. Stated that while at work the participant keeps to themselves and doesn’t 
have a lot of friends. Stated that they check doors and think of ways to be safe if an attack 
happened where they were located. 
Perception of Other Attacks 
Having survived the 2009 attack at Fort Hood effected the manner in which each 
participant viewed more recent attack on the military such as the 2015 attack on the 
recruiting center in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Participant 1 “feels for the families” and 
thinks of the individual victims. Stated that they probably “pause and reflect” a bit more 
than most due to having survived the attack at Fort Hood. Stated that while they keep 
their office doors locked and is more aware of their own protective factors, believe that 
these type of attacks are “inevitable.”  
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Participant 2 also describes feeling connected to the victims of other military 
shootings. This participant tries to reach out to them and help them. Participant two feels 
like military security measures need to be changed. Also thinks everyone should be able 
to carry weapons. Stated that the military should help reduce stigma of mental health and 
also offer more mental health checks. Thinks the military should change procedures “for 
sure”.  
Participant 3 stated that their first reaction to hearing of other shootings, even 
nonmilitary related shootings such as at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, is to wonder how 
these “people get through security.” Noted that “about a year ago” the Army reserve 
center assigned armed guards from within the unit but “doesn’t like the change.”  
Participant 4 expressed disappointment that there were no changes or plans made 
to prevent further shootings. They stated they were upset that these people could attack 
and “nobody blew the whistle on them.” 
Participant 5 expressed strong emotions toward Muslims. They stated, “Be honest 
with you, I’m not real fond of Muslims anymore. People need to wake up about it.” This 
participant clarified that they realize not all Muslims are bad, but that “we need to be 
more aware of our surroundings and of what’s coming.” 
Perspectives of the 2016 DoD Policy Change 
The DoD policy change in 2016 allowed for the carrying of personal weapons by 
soldiers under more lenient circumstances than before. None of the participants were 
aware of the new DoD directive, although participant three previously had heard that it 
might happen. All of the participants had strong opinions regarding this policy change. 
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Participants 2, 4, and 5 all think the policy change will be a positive change. These three 
participants expressed that it was “about time,” a “great idea,” and thinks soldiers 
carrying guns that day at Fort Hood “would have made a big difference.” Participant 4 
and 5 indicated that had the 2016 DoD policy been in effect in 2009, they would have 
carried a concealed firearm while on duty. Participant 5 stated that the 90 day permit limit 
in the new policy is unnecessary and the permit should be “long term.”  
Participant 1 indicated that they feel neutral about the policy change because they 
feel that enhanced training is the more important issue. They believe this policy change 
could help in situations such as an active shooter attack or could possible make things 
worse. They stated concealed carry’s effectiveness depends on the individual and their 
level of training. Participant 3 believes the policy change is a “mistake” and that had the 
policy been in effect in 2009 “many more people would have died.” However, participant 
3 noted that since the policy has changed, the military needs to increase the level of 
training for any soldier who wanted to carry a firearm. 
Suggestions for Increasing a Sense of Security 
The participants all shared suggestions to address the threats from lone wolf 
attacks and their aftermath. As before, participant one represents a discrepant case for the 
final research question. Participant 1 believes that there are limits to the amount of safety 
you can provide. They stated that many people were “devastated that a psychiatrist and a 
senior officer” was responsible for the attack and that having a “major who was a 
psychiatrist who was the shooter proves you can’t predict” who is going to do these types 
of attacks. Therefore, the participant doesn’t think the military can do more to make 
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soldiers more secure other than provide more training in gun safety, mental health, and in 
environmental awareness. Believes that the training received prior to the attack was 
sufficient in preparing soldiers to respond to this type of event. This participant believes 
the military did a “fantastic job” in the aftermath of the attack regarding support and care 
for the survivors. Once again, the protective factors, specifically this participant’s 
experience with helping combat wounded veterans, helps explain the discrepancy. 
The other four participants expressed their belief that the military could have done 
more to prevent the attack and also could have done more to help soldiers recover 
emotionally, physically, and mentally in the aftermath of the attack. Participant 2 stated 
that the military needs to “take better care of their soldiers to begin with.” The military 
“needs to treat soldiers better so that we don’t have disgruntled soldiers.” Examples 
mentioned were to “help with mental health and reduce the stigma associated with it in 
the military.” This participant stated that there was no outlet for reporting someone who 
might pose a safety threat. They stated that the military knew Hasan was a threat but 
“everyone was too scared and was politically correct. Didn’t want to offend anyone.” 
Also believes that armed security forces in different places, especially in big areas were 
there a lot of people gathered, would prevent or deter attacks. Thinks the DoD policy 
change will help. After an attack, better counseling is needed for soldiers in their opinion. 
They believe that military medical personnel needs to make sure the treatment plan is 
working before the military sends them home. “Follow up.” Thinks the military is trying 
to put more training for what to do in situations like this.  
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Participant 3 noted, “Better training is needed to prevent these attacks. Need more 
active shooter training for all soldiers.” Believes that armed guards need extra security 
clearances in order to carry a firearm and stated these extra checks are “not currently 
required.” Vetting process to carry a firearm needs to be an in depth look at “your 
personal history, finances, etc. to see if you are at risk. Better background checks.” 
Participant three also thinks more security forces should be spread out around base and be 
visible. That would deter people from attacking. “They (military) should have given more 
counseling help, and training. Nobody was there to give me training and assist me to get 
back to base.” They wish there was more assistance to help cope. “Had no coping 
training.” Does not think the military did enough to help them return to normalcy. 
Participant 4 also believes that the Military Police should be staged at certain 
places around installations to provide a presence that would “thwart or make somebody 
think twice about attacking.” Need police stationed around the base and visible to 
soldiers.  
“If you hear somebody say something like ‘all soldiers are sinners’ because 
they’re being deployed to Muslim countries….you should take action and do something.” 
If you are unsure, ask somebody. Believes there should be some kind of system where a 
person or people can be available to report someone that might be a harm to other 
soldiers.  
Participant 4 stated that they struggled when returning to Ft. Hood a year later. 
The participant wished they didn’t have to report every morning for formation since there 
were lots of people walking around. This made their post-traumatic stress disorder 
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(PTSD) more prevalent and made them wonder often “if anyone was going to murder 
people today” while in formation. Muster “got to me”. Stated that muster made it worse 
and they were already struggling to get out of bed every day. 
Participant 5 also stated that they believe a “show of force throughout the base 
would make you feel more secure.” Advised the military should have armed guards 
throughout buildings to deter or prevent attacks and to also mitigate casualties. 
“Definitely” thinks stationed armed guards at buildings would deter these attacks and 
save lives. Participant 5 stated that had they returned to duty, they would definitely want 
the concealed carry option.  
Stated that they (military) had information on him (Hasan) before the shooting 
and had an idea that he was “on the edge”. Believes the military should have followed 
through better and done something about him since he was a “terrorist sympathizer.”  
No awareness of a specific place or person to report suspected threats from within 
the military but thinks such a place or office would be beneficial. 
After the attack, Participant 5 saw a physician and counselor as part of the 
Warrior Transition Unit. They stated that at that time an active shooter training was not 
done in the unit due to recommendations from the counselor.  
Believes the military should update training and protocol to identify possible 
threats. States that soldiers “Get plenty of training on sexual assault type of training but 
could have more defensive training.”  
A breakdown of data categories, themes of results, and the direct participant 
quotes used to develop the themes are listed in Table 1. 
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Table 1  
 
Data Categories, Themes of Results, and Direct Participant Quotes 
 
Category Theme Participant Quotes 




No threat to safety “comfortable…never 
thinking about it one way 
or another”, “felt very safe 
on base”, “never gave it 
(safety) a second thought”, 
“thought Fort Hood was 
“very safe “safest place on 
earth” 
 
Structural Experiences Disbelief “didn’t realize the attack 
was real until waking up in 
the ICU”, “thought it was 
fake or an exercise”, 
“thought it was a game or 
training exercise” 
 




“I get more anxious and 
more angry”, “would go 
into a full blown anxiety 
attack if I wasn’t wearing 
my hero bracelet”, 
“hypervigilant and on 
guard”, “didn’t want to be 
alone, especially at night”, 
“weary of Middle Easter 
people”, “can’t eat normal 
at a restaurant”, “have to 
face the door at a 
restaurant”, “a lot of 
depression, a lot of 
drinking”, “I’ll never be 
the same” 
 
Perception of Other 
Attacks 
Shared connections “pause and reflection”, 
“thinks of individual 
victims”, “feel connected 
to other victims…tried to 
reach out to them”, “thinks 
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about how people get past 
security” 
Perspectives of DoD Policy 
Change 
Most support change “It’s about time. I think it’s 
a great idea”, “definitely 
would have made a 
difference (in 2009)” 
 
Suggestions for Increasing 
a Sense of Security 
Better training, show of 
force, and ability to report 
“Take better care of their 
soldiers to begin with”, 
“need more armed security 
forces in different places 
especially in big areas were 
there a lot of people”, 
“Show of force throughout 
the base would make you 





Evidence of Trustworthiness 
Credibility 
I used member checks and reflexivity in order to ensure the credibility of the 
research. During each interview, I asked participants to elaborate on answers that may 
have been ambiguous to the researcher. Additionally, I asked participants to provide 
examples to further explain their beliefs, attitudes, and opinions. Furthermore, I often 
repeated, in my own words, what was being said in order to ensure the participant’s 
viewpoint was accurately being understood. 
Reflexivity can be detrimental to the results of the research. To avoid researcher 
influence in this realm, all interview questions I created utilized neutral language and 




As stated in chapter three, there are several factors which prevent this research 
from being transferable to other populations. The unique nature of the phenomenon under 
study and the small number of the total population required a narrowly constructed 
research plan. Furthermore, the fact that the survivors and the perpetrator were all Army 
soldiers does not lend the results to be transferable to other populations. However, this 
study may lead to research that can further describe how individuals experience and cope 
with surviving lone wolf terror attacks. 
Dependability 
The dependability of the research relied on utilizing specific interview questions 
that employed neutral language and being asked in the same manner to all participants. 
As planned, each interview was audio-recorded and transcribed in Microsoft Word. The 
transcripts were then uploaded to Nvivo 11, where coding and detailed analysis occurred. 
During coding and analysis, an audit trail detailing the researcher thoughts and ideas was 
recorded. The audit trail also described how the transcripts were coded and analyzed. 
Confirmability 
I mitigated researcher bias through the use of an interview protocol that was 
reviewed by the researcher’s dissertation committee and the university’s IRB. The 
interview protocol I created utilized neutral language that did not reveal any aspects of 
the researcher’s attitudes or beliefs about this phenomenon. I audio-recorded each 
interview in full so that field notes and memory were not necessary and the researcher 
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could focus on the interview itself. I transcribed the interviews to ensure that the 
participants’ true experiences were recorded and analyzed appropriately and accurately. 
Summary 
The soldiers had very low or nonexistent threat level awareness in regards to lone 
wolf terrorism prior to the 2009 attack at Fort Hood. They had no forethought that bases 
in America could be the target of an attack, especially from an internal threat.  
Surviving this attack changed the lives of each soldier in many ways. Some of 
these changes included increased levels of awareness, anxiety, and paranoia. Stress 
regarding the attack and their surroundings were common. The manner in which these 
individuals interacted with their professional and personal world changed.  Some of the 
participants have physical ailments that limit them to this day. 
Four participants think the military can change protocol in order to prevent or 
deter future attacks. Furthermore, these four participants think the military can do a better 
job helping soldiers recover from these type of attacks. Suggestions for improving safety 
and a sense of security include stationing a higher number of armed military police in 
prominent areas, more mental health checks, and designated offices to report other 
soldiers who may pose a threat to themselves or others that is outside the chain of 
command. 
The final chapter will detail how the results of this study extend the knowledge in 
the discipline of terrorism research and also how the experiences of the survivors confirm 
some of the previous literature described in Chapter 2. Furthermore, the final chapter will 
108 
 
outline limitations of this study, offer recommendations for further research, and describe 























Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The purpose of this research was to establish a need for measures to address 
threats to the security of armed forces personnel from lone wolf attacks while providing a 
rich, detailed description of survivors’ experiences of the attack at Fort Hood. I identified 
participant’s reflections on improving military personnel’s sense of security while on 
base with the goal of deterring or preventing future attacks and better assisting soldiers in 
the aftermath of these attacks.  
The key findings showed that there was no prior awareness by the participants of 
any threats, external or internal, to their safety. The study showed that each soldier 
suffered from aftereffects of the trauma sustained that day which persist to the present 
day in 2017. The effects ranged from hyperawareness of surroundings, fear of large 
crowds or public places, depression, alcohol abuse, and increased levels of anxiety and 
paranoia. 
Surviving the attack affected the way four out of the five soldiers viewed other 
attacks from lone wolves on military and/or civilian targets. These soldiers felt that the 
military should be more proactive in deterring and preventing these types of attacks. 
Views of the 2016 DoD policy change were mixed, with three soldiers agreeing that the 
change is positive for soldier safety, one being neutral toward the change, and one soldier 
who thought the change was a mistake.  
Suggestions for improving security range from more visible armed military police 
spread throughout the base, improved mental health checks and awareness training, and 
creating a designated office to report suspected internal threats to soldier safety. 
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Interpretation of Findings 
The results of this study confirmed prior research from several scholars, such as 
Coultas (2015), McCauley and Moskalenko (2014), Pfefferbaum et al. (2014), Barnes 
(2012), Phillips (2012), and Monahan (2012). Furthermore, the results of this study 
extended knowledge in the discipline of phenomenology by adding to the body of 
knowledge regarding how survivors of terrorist attacks cope with surviving. This 
extension of knowledge was based on the work performed by Glad, Jensen, Hafstad, & 
Dyb (2016), and Thoreson, Jensen, Wentzel-Larsen, & Dyb, (2014).  
Monahan (2012) studied the effectiveness of utilizing individual risk assessment 
tools used on violent criminals to determine whether or not these tools could be useful in 
identifying suspected terrorists prior to their committing acts of violence. Monahan 
(2012) studied this issue because risk assessment tools for identifying people who might 
commit violence was implement by the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, in direct 
response to the 2009 attack at Fort Hood. Monahan (2012) determined that the current 
risk assessment tools used to identify violent criminals could not be used to identify 
potential terrorists due to the unique nature and characteristics of terrorists. For example, 
risk assessment factors for violent criminals included: criminal history, irresponsible 
lifestyle, psychopathy and criminal attitudes, and substance abuse (Monahan, 2012, p. 
179). None of these characteristics applied to Major Nidal Hasan, who was a psychiatrist 
who had achieved the rank of Major in the United States Army.   
According to Monahan (2012) no study had identified personality traits that 
separate people who commit terrorist activities to those who do not. Instead, Monahan 
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(2012) identified four other risk factors: ideology, affiliation, grievances, and moral 
emotions. McCauley and Moskalenko (2014) similarly identified factors predicting 
terrorist behavior as: grievance, depression, weapons experience, and an “unfreezing” 
event. As they noted in their research, Major Nidal Hasan held a grievance toward the 
military due to the country’s involvement in the War on Terror, had experience with 
weapons, and the unfreezing moment was the notification that Hasan was being deployed 
to Afghanistan. Coupled with his radical beliefs regarding Islam, the West, and his lack 
of close affiliations within the military, Hasan fit the combined profile of these scholars. 
As multiple participants of this research noted, Army officials were aware of Hasan’s 
feelings regarding Islam, the War on Terror, and his role therein.  
The experiences of the five soldiers participating in the study and their 
perceptions/suggestions confirm findings from Coultas (2015), Pfefferbaum et al. (2014), 
Barnes (2012), Phillips (2012). Barnes (2012) suggested that Muslim homegrown 
terrorism, such as the case with Nidal Hasan, was too rare and difficult to stop and 
therefore not worth the resources, manpower, and finances currently being put forth. This 
sentiment was confirmed by one participant, who stated that these attacks were 
“inevitable” and that there was not much more “more the military could do.” However, 
Phillips (2012) and Coultas (2015) offered simple suggestions to deter or prevent lone 
wolf attacks. Phillips (2012) suggested using an economic model of risk/reward, with the 
hypothesis that by increasing the risk terrorists may face in attacking a specific target, 
you decrease the reward of attacking said target and therefore prevent the attack. In this 
study, several participants identified the 2016 DoD directive and/or increased presence of 
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armed Military Police stationed around the base as means to increase risk for potential 
terrorists and therefore reducing the reward.  
Coultas (2015), suggested that utilizing the crowdsourcing method for gathering 
information about suspected terrorist activity would be cost effective and beneficial. 
Coultas (2015) proposed an anonymous system whereby tips could be sent to a database 
reporting suspicious activity. Several soldiers in this study identified a need for a similar 
resource for the military. These soldiers stated that a designated office to anonymously 
report suspected internal threats would allow for the prevention of attacks such as the one 
at Fort Hood. Crowdsourcing presents a possible solution to this suggestion that would be 
simultaneously anonymous, cost effective, and beneficial nationwide throughout our 
military. 
The results of this research also confirmed the findings of Pfefferbaum et al. 
(2014), who found that survivors of the 1993 bombing of the Murrah Federal building in 
Oklahoma City were more negatively impacted by watching media coverage of the 9/11 
attacks than were other individuals. In the current study, each participant suggested that 
when they see or hear of other attacks on the military, they have increased levels of 
anxiety, awareness, and in some cases anger. One participant stated that they pause and 
reflect more because of their own experience. Others stated that they feel connected to 
those victims and are more personally affected by the other attacks. 
Glad, Jensen, Hafstad, and Dyb (2016) interviewed 285 survivors of the 2011 
Utoya Island attack in order to determine whether experiencing trauma reminders was 
correlated to levels of PTSD. Trauma reminders are cues that mirror a traumatic event in 
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some manner and therefore can trigger similar reactions to the traumatic event itself. 
While the current research does not attempt to diagnose PTSD in the participants, the 
trauma reminders that were most frequently indicated from the research of Glad, et al. 
(2016) were relevant to the experiences of participants of this study. 
Auditory reminders were the most commonly cited in the research of Glad, et al., 
(2016). The second most common reminder was situational, such as being amongst large 
crowds. These reminders are very similar to the experiences noted in the interviews of the 
survivors of the 2009 Fort Hood attack. Multiple participants indicated that loud, abrupt 
noises caused heightened reactions and levels of stress. Participant one noted having an 
intensely felt panic attack of about 25 minutes after hearing a shoe hit a window in their 
home.  
The other four participants stated they exhibited heightened fear of public places 
such as at muster, in restaurants, or in other public venues. They indicated that these 
situations increased their fear because they became unsure who they could trust and were 
fearful that another attack could happen.  
Finally, according to Thoreson, Jensen, Wentzel-Larsen, and Dyb (2014), social 
support barriers are highly correlated with incidence of PTSD. The social support barriers 
listed in their study were: survivors thinking others were tired of hearing about the attack, 
people had their own problems, and people might think they were too “caught up in it”, 
they would burden their friends, or that they would not be understood by others 
(Thoreson, et al., 2014, p. 188). While identifying social support barriers was not 
addressed in the current research, it bears reiterating that four of the five participants 
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believed that the military did not offer enough counseling, training, and support in order 
to sufficiently recover from the attack. Participant 2 stated they had to fight to gain access 
for certain medical treatment related to their injuries. Participant 3 stated that the military 
did little to help them recover. It follows from previous research that this perceived lack 
of social and emotional support from the military might correlate with higher levels of 
PTSD, as noted in the research of Thoreson, et al., (2014). 
Limitations of the Study 
There were no unexpected limitations to the study. I conducted the interviews as 
planned and I had no indication that there were limits to the trustworthiness of the 
participants.  
As noted previously, the number of potential participants was substantially 
limited due to the small total population of soldiers who were injured and survived the 
attack at Fort Hood. Additionally, all participants were members of the United States 
Army, which could lead to differences in how they experienced the attack due to the 
nature of the individual who chooses the Army over other branches of the military and/or 
civilian life. 
The main limitation faced in the current research was regarding overcoming the 
personal biases of the researcher and the ideology and belief systems of the participants. 
To mitigate these limitations, interview questions were crafted utilizing very neutral 
language with open ended answers which allowed for the participants to speak freely 
about their experiences. The researcher performed member checks to ensure the message 
being understood and recorded by the researcher matched the intent of the participant. 
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Finally, the interview questions were designed to avoid areas of political ideology 
and gun control issues outside of the confines of the military and the 2016 DoD directive. 
The questions focused on the personal experiences, effects, knowledge, and opinions of 
those soldiers who survived the 2009 attack at Fort Hood and not on broader issues 
related to lone wolf terrorism. 
Recommendations 
The current research revealed several areas of concern within the overall military 
community. The first concern was related to the safety of the men and women who serve 
in the military. Clearly, these participants were not aware of any possible threats to their 
military base and that training is needed in several areas including: active shooter 
response, mental health, and threat level awareness. Additionally, participants offered 
suggestions regarding how to better protect the men and women of the military. 
In this study, I identified a sense from these soldiers that the military can and 
should be doing more to assist soldiers in recovery from these types of attacks. I also 
found a desire from participants to implement measures in order to increase the sense of 
security soldiers have while on duty. 
To those ends, I recommend future research into several areas regarding the 
military community. Initially, a current assessment of protocols, procedures, and trainings 
needs to be conducted to ensure that these programs are being implemented properly, 
effectively, and that they are adequately understood by base commanders, their 
subordinates, and the rank and file of the military itself.  
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Next, a survey of attitudes and beliefs among military personnel should be 
conducted. This survey would expand the sample size to include any active duty or 
reserve personnel and would assess four themes identified in the current research. First, 
assess their awareness level of threats, both internally and externally, while on base. 
Second, evaluate the perception of the 2016 DoD policy change among members of the 
military to include: an assessment of their awareness of the policy, awareness and 
accessibility of training opportunities, and knowledge of the requirements to carry a 
personally owned concealed firearm while on base. Third, determine if the military 
population in general agrees with the suggestions for improving a sense of security 
provided from the current research; namely increasing the number and presence of 
Military Police and creating a specific office to report suspected threats to military safety. 
Fourth, future research should be created to address the perceptions revealed in 
the current study which suggest that the support services available to members of the 
military are insufficient, especially for those who have suffered from physical, emotional, 
or mental trauma related to their service. 
In the event that the suggestions of increasing the number and presence of 
Military Police and creating an anonymous manner for reporting suspected internal 
threats is implemented, follow up studies can be conducted to evaluate the 
implementation and effectiveness of these initiatives. These studies can expand on 
Phillips’s (2012) economic risk/reward model for deterring and preventing lone wolf 
terror attacks and on Coultas’s (2015) recommendation of using crowdsourcing methods 
as a means to identify and apprehend potential terrorists. 
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Finally, another phenomenological study interviewing victims of attacks on the 
military recruiting centers would be beneficial for comparison to the participants of the 
current study. Doing so would allow for researchers to gain a more comprehensive view 
of the effects that these type of attacks have by comparing and contrasting recruiting 
center attacks with the attack at Fort Hood.  
Implications  
The implication for the positive social change associated with this study holds 
significant potential impact for three groups. The three groups consist of individuals in 
the military, their families, and the military organization itself. 
Individuals 
First and foremost, individuals and their families associated with the military will 
be the most affected by this research, especially for those survivors of lone wolf attacks 
targeting the military. These individuals and their families would greatly benefit from 
increased security measures on military installations and extensive training for these 
types of situations by having more confidence in the safety of their loved ones who serve.  
Families 
In addition to feeling more secure and being better prepared, the value of actually 
deterring and preventing an attack that could result in lives lost and permanently 
damaged is immeasurable. Families of military personnel will benefit from knowing that 
the military is taking proper precautions and measures to insure the safety of their 
soldiers and to care for soldiers in the event that they experience trauma related to 
military service.  
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The United States Military 
The military organization as a whole would also benefit from the positive social 
change associated with this research. The military is responsible for over one million 
members. By protecting their safety with all available measures and caring for those in 
need of physical, emotional, or psychological help; overall morale could increase within 
the organization and lead to better health outcomes for those who serve. 
The results of this research and the implementation of the suggestions gathered 
being put into practice would also show the value of the community based approach to 
policy making. As the military is structured in a top-down command structure, it is 
important to gather the input, experiences, and contributions from members of the 
military at all levels, in all branches, and across multiple disciplines of military 
occupational specialties in order to make policy decisions that are valuable, efficient, and 
comprehensive to the needs of all military personnel. 
Conclusions 
The men and women of the military serve the purpose of providing national 
security and defense from threats, both foreign and domestic, to the security of the United 
States. Members of the military deserve the best tactics and policies available to keep 
them safe at home and abroad.  
The current research results suggest that there is much to be gained from detailing 
the experiences of those soldiers who have survived lone wolf attacks targeting the 
military. Their sacrifice and experiences offer invaluable insights into understanding how 
soldiers cope with these events, how to possibly deter or prevent future attacks, and how 
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the military can best support those members who suffer from these attacks and other 
similar types of trauma. These suggestions can prove to be a substantial source of 
positive change within the community of the military. The sacrifices and struggles 
associated with members of the military who experience trauma and loss can offer 
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Appendix A: Facebook Contact Message 
Facebook Contact Message 
Dear _____________, 
 My name is William Moravits and I am a doctoral candidate at Walden 
University. I am contacting you to invite you to participate in my research study in order 
to help better understand how the Department of Defense military gun control policy and 
the 2009 shooting at Ft. Hood affected your experience as an Army soldier.  
 I am inviting all soldiers who were injured in this shooting to be in the study. I 
obtained your name from an online list of the Ft. Hood survivors and found your social 
media profile through Facebook. Participation would require an interview conducted via 
Facetime/Skype or over the phone. The interview take between thirty and sixty minutes 
and be scheduled at your convenience. 
 I understand that this event is very delicate in nature. I assure you that my sole 
purpose is to help and assist the military in understanding these events and assisting in 
better protecting the military in the future. If you are interested, please read the attached 
consent form to gain more information. 
 In order to participate, please reply to me via Facebook indicating that you agree 
to participate.  
 Please note that this study is still in its early stages and your participation will 
take place at a later date. If you have any questions about the study that are not answered 
in the consent form, please contact me. 













Appendix B: Interview Questions 
1. Describe your view of personal safety while on base prior to the lone wolf attack. 
How aware were you of any threats from lone wolf terrorism? 
 
2. Describe your experience that day beginning when you arrived at your post. 
Describe how the attack affected your perception of personal safety afterwards 
 
3. How did your experience effect your daily life and work while at Ft. Hood or on 
another base?  How did your perceptions towards coworkers, your environment, 
or any other aspect of military life change? How has it effected your post military 
life? 
 
4. How has your experience impacted the way that you view the more recent lone 
wolf attacks on members of the military? Describe how these events relate to your 
experience. 
 
5. What was your personal view of the 1992 DoD directive banning soldiers from 
carrying weapons on base? How has your experience of being a survivor of the 
2009 Ft. Hood shooting effected your view on the 2016 military directive 
allowing the concealed carrying of personally owned weapons? 
 
6. What can the military do to help the soldiers feel more protected while on base? 
What suggestions do you have for increasing a sense of security for soldiers in 
light of experiencing this event? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
